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Abstract—Several static analysis tools, such as Splint or FindBugs, have been proposed to the software development community to
help detect security vulnerabilities or bad programming practices. However, the adoption of these tools is hindered by their high false
positive rates. If the false positive rate is too high, developers may get acclimated to violation reports from these tools, causing concrete
and severe bugs being overlooked. Fortunately, some violations are actually addressed and resolved by developers. We claim that
those violations that are recurrently fixed are likely to be true positives, and an automated approach can learn to repair similar unseen
violations. However, there is lack of a systematic way to investigate the distributions on existing violations and fixed ones in the wild,
that can provide insights into prioritizing violations for developers, and an effective way to mine code and fix patterns which can help
developers easily understand the reasons of leading violations and how to fix them.
In this paper, we first collect and track a large number of fixed and unfixed violations across revisions of software. The empirical
analyses reveal that there are discrepancies in the distributions of violations that are detected and those that are fixed, in terms of
occurrences, spread and categories, which can provide insights into prioritizing violations. To automatically identify patterns in violations
and their fixes, we propose an approach that utilizes convolutional neural networks to learn features and clustering to regroup similar
instances. We then evaluate the usefulness of the identified fix patterns by applying them to unfixed violations. The results show that
developers will accept and merge a majority (69/116) of fixes generated from the inferred fix patterns. It is also noteworthy that the
yielded patterns are applicable to four real bugs in the Defects4J major benchmark for software testing and automated repair.
Index Terms—Fix pattern, pattern mining, program repair, findbugs violation, unsupervised learning.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Modern software projects widely use static code analysis
tools to assess software quality and identify potential de-
fects. Several commercial [1], [2], [3] and open-source [4],
[5], [6], [7] tools are integrated into many software projects,
including operating system development projects [8]. For
example, Java-based projects often adopt FindBugs [4] or
PMD [5] while C projects use Splint [6], cppcheck [7],
or Clang Static Analyzer [9], while Linux driver code
are systematically assessed with a battery of static analyzers
such as Sparse and the LDV toolkit. Developers may benefit
from the tools before running a program in real environ-
ments even though those tools do not guarantee that all
identified defects are real bugs [10].
Static analysis can detect several types of defects such
as security vulnerabilities, performance issues, and bad
programming practices (so-called code smells) [11]. Re-
cent studies denote those defects as static analysis viola-
tions [12] or alerts [13]. In the remainder of this paper,
we simply refer to them as violations. Fig. 1 shows a viola-
tion instance, detected by FindBugs, which is a violation
tagged BC_EQUALS_METHOD_SHOULD_WORK_FOR_ALL_OBJECTS,
as it does not comply with the programming rule that the
implementation of method equals(Object obj) should
not make any assumption about the type of its obj argu-
ment [14].
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public boolean equals(Object obj) {
// Violation Type:
// BC_EQUALS_METHOD_SHOULD_WORK_FOR_ALL_OBJECTS
return getModule().equals(
((ModuleWrapper) obj).getModule());
}
Fig. 1: Example of a detected violation, taken from Popu-
lateRepositoryMojo.java file at revision bdf3fe in project
nbm-maven-plugin1.
As later addressed by developers via a patch represented
in Fig. 2, the method should return false if obj is not
of the same type as the object being compared. In this
case, when the type of obj argument is not the type of
ModuleWrapper, a java.lang.ClassCastException
should be thrown.
public boolean equals(Object obj) {
- return getModule().equals(
- ((ModuleWrapper) obj).getModule());
+ return obj instanceof ModuleWrapper &&
+ getModule().equals(
+ ((ModuleWrapper) obj).getModule());
}
Fig. 2: Example of fixing violation, taken from Commit
0fd11c of project nbm-maven-plugin.
Despite wide adoption and popularity of static analysis
tools (e.g., FindBugs has more than 270K downloads2),
accepting the results of the tools is not yet guaranteed.
Violations identified by static analysis tools are often ig-
nored by developers [15], since static analysis tools may
1https://github.com/mojohaus/nbm-maven-plugin
2http://findbugs.sourceforge.net/users.html
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2yield high rates of false positives. Actually, a (false positive)
violation might be (1) not a serious enough concern to fix,
(2) less likely to occur in a runtime environment, or (3)
just incorrectly identified due to the limitations of the tool.
Depending on the context, developers may simply give up
on the use of static analysis tools or they may try to prioritize
violations based on their own criteria.
Nevertheless, we can regard a violation as true positive
if it is recurrently removed by developers through source
code changes as in the example of Fig. 2. Otherwise, a
violation can be considered as ignored (i.e., not removed
during revisions) or disappearing (a file or program entity
is removed from a project) instead of being fixed. We inves-
tigate in this study different research questions regarding
(RQ1) to what extent do violations recur in projects? (RQ2)
what types of violations are actually fixed by developers?(i.e., true
positives) (RQ3) what are the patterns of violations code that
are fixed or unfixed by developers? From this question, we can
identify common code patterns of violations that could help
better understand static analysis rules. (RQ4) how are the
violations resolved when developers make changes? Based on this
question, for each violation type, we can derive fix patterns
that may help summarize common violation (or real bug)
resolutions and may be applied to fixing similar unfixed
violations. (RQ5) can fix patterns help systematize the resolution
of similar violations? This question may shed some light on
the effectiveness of common fix patterns when applying
them to potential defects.
To answer the above questions, we investigate violations
and violation fixing changes collected from 730 open source
Java projects. Although the approach is generic to any
static bug detection tool, we focus on a single tool, namely
FindBugs, applying it to every revision of each project. We
thus identify violations in each revision and further enu-
merate cases where a pair of consecutive revisions involve
the resolution of a violation through source code change
(i.e., the violation is found in revision r1 and is absent
from r2 after a code change can be mapped to the violation
location): we refer to such recorded changes as violation
fixing changes. We further conduct empirical analyses on
identified violations and fixed violations to investigate their
recurrences, their code patterns, etc.
After collecting violation fixing changes from a large
number of projects using an AST differencing tool [16], we
mine developer fix patterns for static analysis violations.
The approach encodes a fixing change into a vector space
using Word2Vec [17], extracts discriminating features using
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) [18] and regroups
similar changes into a cluster using X-means clustering algo-
rithm [19]. We then evaluate the suitability of the mined fix
patterns by applying them to 1) a subset of unfixed viola-
tions in our subjects, to 2) a subset of faults in Defects4J [20]
and to 3) a subset of violations in 10 open source Java
projects.
Overall, this paper makes the following contributions:
1) Large-scale dataset of static analysis violations: we
have carefully and systematically tracked static analysis
violations across all revisions of a large set of projects.
This dataset, which has required substantial effort to
build, is available to the community in a labelled format,
including the violation fixing change information.
We release a dataset of 16,918,530 unique samples
of FindBugs violations across revisions of 730 Java
projects, along with 88,927 code changes addressing
some of these violations.
2) Empirical study on real-world management of
FindBugs’ violations: our study explores the nature of
violations that are widespread across projects and con-
trasts the recurrence of developer (non)fixes for specific
categories, providing insights for prioritization research
to limit deterrence due to overwhelming false positives,
thus contributing towards improving tool adoption.
Our analyses reveal cases of violations that appear to
be systematically ignored by developers, and viola-
tion categories that are recurrently addressed. The
pattern mining of violation code further provides
insights into how violations can be prioritized to-
wards enabling static bug detection tools to be more
adopted.
3) Violation fix pattern mining: we propose an approach to
infer common fix patterns of violations leveraging CNNs
and X-means clustering algorithm. Such patterns can
be leveraged in subsequent research directions such as
automated refactoring tools (for complying with project
rules as done by checkpatch3,4 in the Linux kernel devel-
opment), or automated program repair (by providing fix
ingredients to existing tools such as PAR [21]).
Mined fix patterns can be leveraged to help develop-
ers rapidly and systematically address high-priority
cases of static violations. In our experiments, we
showed that 40% of a sample set of 500 unfixed
violations could be immediately addressed with the
inferred fix patterns.
4) Pattern-based violation patching: we apply the fix pat-
terns to unfixed violations and actual bugs in real-world
programs. Our experiments demonstrate the potential of
the approach to infer patterns that are effective which
shows the potential of automated patch generation based
on the fix patterns.
Developers are ready to accept fixes generated based
on mined fix patterns. Indeed out of 113 generated
patches, 69 were merged in 10 open source projects.
It is noteworthy that since static analysis can uncover
important bugs, mined patterns can be leveraged
for automated repair. Out of the 14 real-bugs in the
Defects4J benchmark which can be detected with
FindBugs, our mined fix patterns are immediately
applicable to produce correct fixes for 4 bugs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
We propose our study method in Section 2, describing the
process of violation tracking, and the approach for mining
3http://tuxdiary.com/2015/03/22/check-kernel-code-checkpatch
4https://github.com/spotify/linux/blob/master/scripts/
checkpatch.pl
3code patterns based on CNNs. Section 3 presents the study
results in response to the research questions. Limitations of
our study are outlined in Section 4. Section 5 surveys related
work. We conclude the paper in Section 6with discussions of
future work. Several intermediary results, notably w.r.t. the
statistics of violations are most detailed in the appendix.
2 METHODOLOGY
Our study aims at uncovering common code patterns re-
lated to static analysis violations and to developers’ fixes. As
shown in Figure 3, our study method unfolds in four steps:
(1) applying a static analysis tool to collecting violations
from programs, (2) tracking violations across the history
of program revisions, (3) identifying fixed and unfixed
violations, (4) mining common code patterns in each class
of violations, and (5) mining common fix patterns in each
class of fixed violations. We describe in details these steps
as well as the techniques employed.
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Fig. 3: Overview of our study method.
2.1 Collecting violations
To collect violations from a program, we apply a static
analysis tool to every revision of the associated project’s
source code. Given the resource-intensive nature of this
process, we focus in this study on the FindBugs [22] tool,
although our method is applicable to other static analysis
tools such as Facebook Infer5, Google ErrorProne6, etc. We
use the most sensitive option to detect all types of violations
defined in FindBugs violation descriptions [14]. For each
individual violation instance, we record, as a six-tuple value,
all information on the violation type, the enclosing program
entity (e.g., project, class or method), the commit id, the
file path, and the location (i.e., start and end line numbers)
where the violation is detected. Figure 4 shows an example
of a violation record in the collected dataset.
Since FindBugs requires Java bytecode rather than
source code, and given that violations must be tracked
across all revisions in a project, it is necessary to automate
the compilation process. In this study, we accept projects
that support the Apache Maven [23] build automation man-
agement tool. We apply maven build command (i.e., ‘mvn
package install’) to compiling each revision in 2014 projects
that we have collected. Eventually, we were able to success-
fully build 730 automatically.
5http://fbinfer.com/
6https://errorprone.info/
7https://github.com/GWASpi/GWASpi
<ViolationInstance>
<ViolationType>NP_NULL_ON_SOME_PATH</ViolationType>
<ProjectName>GWASpi-GWASpi</ProjectName>
<CommitVersionID>b0ed41</CommitVersionID>
<FilePath>src/main/java/org/gwaspi/gui/reports/
Report_AnalysisPanel.java</FilePath>
<StartLineNumber>89</StartLineNumber>
<EndLineNumber>89</EndLineNumber>
</ViolationInstance>
Fig. 4: Example record of a single-line violation of
type NP_NULL_ON_SOME_PATH found in ReportAnalysis-
Panel.java file within Commit b0ed41 in GWASpi7 project.
2.2 Tracking violations
Violation tracking consists in identifying identical violation
instances between consecutive revisions: after applying a
static analysis tool to a specific revision of a project, one can
obtain a set of violations. In the next version, another set of
violations can be produced by the tool. If there is any change
in the next revision, new violations can be introduced and
existing ones may disappear. In many cases however, code
changes can move violation positions, making this process
a non-trivial task.
Static analysis tools often report violations with line
numbers in source code files. Even when a commit mod-
ifies other lines in different source file than the location
of a violation, it might be unable to use line numbers for
matching identical violation pairs between two consecutive
revisions. Yet, if the tracking is not precise, the identification
of fixed violations may suffer from many false positives
and negatives (i.e., identifying unfixed ones as fixed ones
or vice versa). Thus, to match potential identical violations
between revisions, our study follows the method proposed
by Avgustinov et al. [24]. This method has three different vi-
olation matching heuristics when a file containing violations
is changed. The first heuristic is (1) location-based matching:
if a (potential) matching pair of violations is in code change
diffs8, it compares the offset of the corresponding violations
in the code change diffs. If the difference of the offset is
equal to or lower than 3, we regard the matching pair as an
identical violation. When a matching pair is located in two
different code snapshots, we use (2) snippet-based matching:
if two text strings of the code snapshots (corresponding to
the same type of violations in two revisions) are identical,
we can match those violations. When the two previous
heuristics are not successful, our study applies (3) hash-
based matching, which is useful when a file containing a
violation is moved or renamed. This matching heuristic first
computes the hash value of adjacent tokens of a violation. It
then compares the hash values between two revisions. We
refer the reader to more details on the heuristics in [24].
There have been several other techniques developed to
do this task. For example, Spacco et al. [25] proposed a fuzzy
matcher. It can match violations in different source locations
between revisions even when a source code file has been
moved by package renaming. Other studies [26], [27] also
provide violation matching heuristics based on software
change histories. However, these are not precise enough to
8A “code change diff” consists of two code snapshots. One snapshot
represents the code fragment that will be affected by a code change, and
another one represents the code fragment after it has been affected by
the code change.
4be automatically applied to a large number of violations in
a long history of revisions [24].
2.3 Identifying fixed violations
Once violation tracking is completed, we can figure out the
resolution of an individual violation. Violation resolution
can result in three different outcomes. (1) A violation can
disappear due to deleting a file or a method enclosing the
violation. (2) A violation exists at the latest revision after
tracking (even some code is changed), which indicates that
the violation has not been fixed so far. (3) A violation can
be resolved by changing specific lines (including code line
deletion) of source code. The literature refer to the first and
second outcomes as unactionable violations [26], [27], [28] or
false positives [25], [29], [30] while the third one is called
actionable violations or true positives. In this study we inspect
violation tracking results, focusing on the second outcome
(which yields the set of unfixed violations) and the third
outcome (which yield the set of fixed violations).
Starting from the earliest revision where a violation is
seen, we follow subsequent revisions until a later revision
has no matching violation (i.e., the violation is resolved by
removal of the file/method or the code has been changed).
If the violation location in the source code is in a diff pair,
we classify it as a fixed violation. Otherwise, it is an unfixed
violation.
2.4 Mining common code patterns
Our goal in this step is to understand how a violation is in-
duced. To achieve this goal, we mine code fragments where
violations are localized and identify common patterns, not
only in fixed violations but also in unfixed violations. Before
describing our approach of mining common code patterns,
we formalize the definition of a code pattern, and provide
justifications for the techniques selected in the approach
(namely CNNs [18], [31], [32] and X-means clustering algo-
rithm [19]).
2.4.1 Preliminaries
Definition of code patterns: In this study, a code pattern
refers to a generic representation of similar source code
fragments. Its definition is related to the definition of a source
code entity and of a code context.
Definition 1. Source Code Entity (Sce): A source code entity
(hereafter entity) is a pair of type and identifier, which
denotes a node in an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) represen-
tation, i.e.,
Sce = (Type, Identifier) (1)
where Type is an AST node type and Identifier is a textual
representation (i.e., raw token) of an AST node, respectively.
Definition 2. Code Context (Ctx): A code context is a three-
element tuple, which is extracted from a fined-grained AST
subtree (see Section 2.4.2) associated to a code block, i.e.,
Ctx = (Sce, Scep, cctx) (2)
where Sce is an entity and Scep is the parent entity of Sce
(with Scep = ∅ when Sce is a root entity). cctx is a list of
code contexts that are the children of Ctx. When Sce is a leaf
node entity, cctx = ∅.
Definition 3. Code Pattern (CP): A code pattern is a three-
value tuple as following:
CP = (Scea, Scec, cctx) (3)
where Scea is a set of abstract entities of which identifiers are
abstracted from concrete representations of specific identi-
fiers that will not affect the common semantic characteristics
of the code pattern. Scec is a set of concrete entities, of
which identifiers are concrete, that can represent the com-
mon semantic characteristics of the code pattern. Abstract
entities represent that the entities of a code pattern can be
specified in actual instances while concrete entities indicate
characteristics of a code pattern and cannot be abstracted.
Otherwise, the code pattern will be changed. cctx is a set of
code contexts (See Definition 2) that are used to explain the
relationships among all entities in this code pattern.
Source Code:
return (String[]) list.toArray(new String[0]);
A Code Pattern:
return (T[]) var.toArray(new T[#]);
Scea = {(ArrayType, T[]), (Variable, var), (NumberLiteral, #)}.
Scec = {(ReturnStatement, return), (Method, toArray)}.
cctx=  {
c1. ((ReturnStatement, return), (null, null), [1
c2.     (CastExpression, (T[])), (ReturnStatement, return), [2
c3.         ((ArrayType, T[]), (CastExpression, (T[])), ∅), 
c4.         ((MethodInvocation, var.toArray), (CastExpression, (T[])), [4
c5.             ((Variable, var), (MethodInvocation, var.toArray), ∅),
c6.             ((Method, toArray), (MethodInvocation, var.toArray), [6
c7.                 ((ArrayCreation, new T[]), (MethodInvocation, var.toArray), [7
c8.                     ((ArrayType, T[]), (ArrayCreation, new T[]), ∅),
c9.                     ((NumberLiteral, #), (ArrayCreation, T), ∅)]7)]6)]4)]2)]1)
}.
CP = (Scea,  Scec, cctx).
Fig. 5: Example representation of a code pattern.
Figure 5 shows an example of a code pattern extracted
from the source code. Scea contains an array type entity
(ArrayType, T[]), a variable name entity (Variable,
var), and a number literal entity (NumberLiteral, #),
where T[] is abstracted from the identifier String[]
of (ArrayType, String[]), var is abstracted from the
identifier list in (Variable, list), and identifier # is
abstracted from the number literal 0. The three identifiers
of the three entities can also be abstracted from other re-
lated similar entities, which will not change the attributes
of this pattern. Scec consists of a (ReturnStatement,
return) entity and a method invocation entity (Method,
toArray). The identifiers of the two entities cannot be
abstracted, otherwise, the attributes of this pattern will
be changed. If extracting code pattern from the code
at the level of violated source code expression (i.e., the
code pattern is (T[]) var.toArray(new T[#])), the
(ReturnStatement, return) node entity can be ab-
stracted as a null entity because this node entity will not
affect this code pattern.
5cctx contains a code context that explains the rela-
tionships among these entities, of which code block is a
ReturnStatement. c1 is the code context of the root source
code entity ReturnStatement and consists of three values.
The first one is the current Sce that contains a Type and
an Identifier. The second one is the Scep of the current Sce
which is null as Sce is a root entity. The last one is a list
of code contexts which are c1’s children. It is the same as
others. c2 is the direct child of c1. c3 and c4 are the direct
children of c2. The source code entity of c3 is a leaf node
entity, as a result, its child set is null. It is the same for
others.
Suitability of Convolutional Neural Networks: Grouping
code requires the use of discriminating code features to
compute reliable metrics of similarity. While the majority
of feature extraction strategies perform well on fixed-length
samples, it should be noted that code fragments often
consist of multiple code entities with variable lengths. A
single code entity such as a method call may embody some
local features in a given code fragment, while several such
features must be combined to reflect the overall features
of the whole code fragment. It is thus necessary to adopt
a technique which can enable the extraction of both local
features and the synthesis of global features that will best
characterize code fragments so that similar code fragments
can be regrouped together by a classical clustering algo-
rithm. Note that the objective is not to train a classifier
whose output will be some classification label given a code
fragment or the code change of a patch. Instead, we adopt
the idea of unsupervised learning [33] and lazy learning [34]
to extract discriminating features of code fragments and
patch code changes.
Recently, a number of studies [35], [36], [37], [38], [39],
[40], [41] have provided empirical evidence to support the
naturalness of software [42], [43]. A recent work by Bui et
al. [44] has provided preliminary results showing that some
variants of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) are
even effective to capture code semantics so as to allow
the accurate classification of code implementations across
programming languages.
Inspired by the naturalness hypothesis, we treat source
code of violations as documents written in natural language
and to which we apply CNNs to addressing the objective of
feature learning. CNNs are biologically-inspired variants of
multi-layer artificial neural networks [31]. We leveraged the
LeNet5 [45] model, which involves lower- and upper-layers.
Lower-layers are composed of alternating convolutional and
subsampling layers which are local-connected to capture the
local features of input data, while upper-layers are fully-
connected and correspond to traditional multi-layer percep-
trons (a hidden layer and a logistic regression classifier),
which can synthesize all local features captured by previous
lower-layers.
Choice of X-means clustering algorithm: While K-Means
is a classical algorithm that is widely used, it poses the
challenge of a try-and-err protocol for specifying the num-
ber K of clusters. Given that we lack prior knowledge on
the approximate number of clusters which can be inferred,
we rely on X-Means [19], an extended version of K-Means,
which effectively and automatically estimate the value of K
based on Bayesian Information Criterion.
2.4.2 Refining the Abstract Syntax Tree
In our study, code patterns are inferred based on the tokens
that are extracted from the AST of code fragments, i.e., the
node types and identifiers. Preliminary observations reveal
that some tokens generically tagged SimpleName in leaf
nodes can interfere feature learning of code fragments. For
example, in Figure 7, the variable node list is presented as
(SimpleName, list), and the method node toArray is
also presented as (SimpleName, toArray) at the leaf node
in the generic AST tree. As a result, it may be challenging to
distinguish the two nodes from each other. Hence, a method
of refining the generic AST tree is necessary to reduce such
confusions.
Algorithm 1 illustrates the algorithm of refining a generic
AST tree. The refined AST tree keeps the basic construct of
the generic AST tree. If the label of a current node can be
specified as a SimpleName leaf node in generic AST tree,
the node will be simplified as a single-node construct by
combining its discriminating grammar type and its label
(i.e., identifier), and its label-related children will be re-
moved in the refined AST tree.
Algorithm 1: Refining a generic AST tree.
Input: A generic AST tree T .
Output: A refined AST tree Trf .
1 Function refineAST(T)
2 r← T.currentNode;
3 Trf .currentNode← r;
4 if r’s label can be a SimpleName node then
5 // r’s label can be specified as a SimpleName leaf node;
6 Remove SimpleName-related children from r;
7 Update r to (r.Type, r.Label.identifier) in Trf ;
8 foreach child ∈ r.children do
9 childrenrf .add( refineAST (child) );
10 Trf .currentNode.children← childrenrf ;
11 return Trf ;
Figure 7 shows the models respectively of the generic
AST tree and of the refined AST tree of a code fragment
containing a return statement. First, the refined tree presents
a simplified architecture. Second, it becomes easier to dis-
tinguish some different nodes with the refined AST tree
than the generic AST tree nodes. The node of array type
String[] is simplified as (ArrayType, String[]), the
variable (SimpleName, list) is simplified as (Variable,
a), and the method invocation of toArray is simpli-
fied as (Method, toArray). Although the method node
toArray can be identified by visiting its parent node (i.e.,
MethodInvocation), it requires more steps to obtain this
information. In the refined AST tree, the two nodes are
presented as (Variable, list) and (Method, toArray)
respectively. Consequently, it becomes easier to distinguish
the two nodes with the refined AST tree than the generic
AST tree nodes.
To understand which implementations induce static
analysis violations, we design an approach for mining com-
mon code patterns of detected violations. The patterns are
expected to summarize the main ingredients of code violat-
ing a given static analysis rules. This approach involves two
phases: data preprocessing and violation patterns mining,
as illustrated in Figure 6.
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Fig. 6: Overview of our code patterns mining method.
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Tree A: the generic AST tree.
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A Tree Node:
Tree B: the refined AST tree.
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ArrayType String[] MethodInvocation
Variable list
ReturnStatement Return
CastExpression
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ArrayCreation new
ArrayType String[] NumberLiteral 0
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Code: return (String[]) list.toArray(new String[0]);
Fig. 7: Generic and Refined AST of an example code fragment.
2.4.3 Data preprocessing
FindBugs, reports violations by specifying the start and
end lines of a code hunk which is relevant to the reported
violation: this is considered as the location of the violation.
It is challenging to mine common code patterns from these
code hunks directly as they are just textual expression.
A given violation code is therefore parsed into a refined
AST tree and converted into a token vector. Token vectors
are further embedded with Word2Vec [46] and converted
into numeric vectors which can be fed to CNNs to learn
discriminating features of violation code.
Violation tokenization
In order to represent violations with numeric vectors, in this
study, violations are tokenized into textual vectors in the
first step. All code hunks of violations are parsed with the
refined AST tree and are tokenized into textual vectors by
traversing their refined AST trees with the depth-first search
algorithm to obtain two kinds of tokens: one is the AST
node type and another is the identifier (i.e., raw token) of
this node. For example, the code “int a” is tokenized as a
vector of four tokens (PrimitiveType, int, Variable, a).
A given violation is thus represented as a vector of such to-
kens. Noisy information of nodes (e.g., meaningless variable
names such as ‘a’, ‘b’, etc.) can interfere with identifying
similar violations. Thus, all variable names are renamed
as the combination of their data type and string ‘Var’. For
example, variable a in “int a” is renamed as intVar.
Token embedding with Word2Vec
Widely adopted deep learning techniques require numeric
vectors with the same size as the format of input data.
Tokens embedding is performed with Word2Vec [46] which
can yield a numeric vector for each unique token. Even-
tually, a violation is then embedded as a two-dimensional
numeric vector (i.e., a vector of the vectors embedding
the tokens). Since token vectors may have different sizes
throughout violations, the corresponding numeric vectors
must be padded to comply with deep learning algorithms
requirements. We follow the workaround tested by Wang et
al. [47] and append 0 to all vectors to make all vector sizes
consistent with the size of the longest vector.
Word2Vec9 [48] is a two-layer neural network, whose
main purpose is to embed words, i.e., convert each word
into a numeric vector.
Numerical representations of tokens can be fed to deep
learning neural networks or simply queried to identify rela-
tionships among words. For example, relationships among
words can be computed by measuring cosine similarity
of vectors, given that Word2Vec strives to regroup similar
words together in the vector space. Lack of similarity is
expressed as a 90-degree angle, while complete similarity
of 1 is expressed as a 0-degree angle. For example, in our
experiment, ‘true’ and ‘false’ are boolean literal in Java.
There is a cosine similarity of 0.9433768 between ‘true’ and
‘false’, the highest similarity between ‘true’ and any other
token.
The left side of Figure 8 shows how a violation is
vectorized. The n×k represents a two-dimensional numeric
vector of an embedded and vectorized violation, where n
is the number of rows and denotes the size of the token
vector of a violation. A row represents a numeric vector
of an embedded token. k is the number of columns and
denotes the size of a one-dimensional numeric vector of an
embedded token. The last two rows represent the appended
0 to make all numeric vector sizes consistent.
9https://code.google.com/archive/p/word2vec/
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Fig. 8: CNN architecture for extracting clustering features. C1 is the first convolutional layer, and C2 is the second one. S1 is
the first subsampling layer, and S2 is the second one. The output of dense layer is considered as extracted features of code
fragments and will be used to do clustering.
2.4.4 Code Patterns Mining
Although violations can be parsed and converted into two-
dimensional numeric vectors, it is still challenging to mine
code patterns given that noisy information (e.g., specific
meaningless identifiers) can interfere with identifying sim-
ilar violations. Deep learning has recently been shown
promising in various software engineering tasks [18], [47],
[49]. In particular, it offers a major advantage of requiring
less prior knowledge and human effort in feature design for
machine learning applications. Consequently, our method is
designed to deeply learn discriminating features for mining
code patterns of violations. We leverage CNNs to perform
deep learning of violation features with embedded viola-
tions, and also use X-means clustering algorithm to cluster
violations with learned features.
Feature learning with CNNs
Figure 8 shows the CNNs architecture for learning violation
features. The input is two-dimensional numeric vectors
of preprocessed violations. The alternating local-connected
convolutional and subsampling layers are used to capture
the local features of violations. The dense layer compresses
all local features captured by former layers. We select the
output of the dense layer as the learned violation features
to cluster violations. Note that our approach uses CNNs to
extract features of violation code fragments, in contrast to
normal supervised learning applications that classify labels
with training process to show patterns clearly.
Violations Clustering and Patterns Labelling
With learned features of violations, cluster violations with
X-means clustering algorithm. In this study, we use Weka’s
implementation [50] of X-means to cluster violations. Finally,
we manually label each cluster with identified code patterns
of violations from clustered similar code fragments of viola-
tions to show patterns clearly. Note that, the whole process
of mining patterns is automated.
2.5 Mining Common Fix Patterns
Our goal in this step is to summarize how a violation
is resolved by developers. To achieve this goal, we col-
lect violation fixing changes and proceed to identify their
common fix patterns. The approach of mining common fix
patterns is similar to that of mining common code patterns.
The differences lie in the data collection and tokenization
process. Before describing our approach of mining common
fix patterns, we formalize the definitions of patch and fix
pattern.
2.5.1 Preliminaries
A patch represents a modification carried on a program
source code to repair the program which was brought to
an erroneous state at runtime. A patch thus captures some
knowledge on modification behavior, and similar patches
may be associated with similar behavioral changes.
Definition 4. Patch (P): A patch is a pair of source code
fragments, one representing a buggy version and another
as its updated (i.e., bug-fixing) version. In the traditional
GNU diff representation of patches, the buggy version is
represented by lines starting with -, while the fixed version
is represented by lines starting with +. A patch is formalized
as:
P = (Fragb, F ragf ) (4)
where Fragb and Fragf are fragments of buggy/fixing
code, respectively; both are a set of text lines. Either of
the two sets can be an empty set but cannot be empty
simultaneously. If Fragb = ∅, the patch purely adds a
new line(s) to fix a bug. On the other hand, the patch only
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Fig. 9: Overview of our fix patterns mining method.
removes a line(s) if Fragf = ∅. Otherwise (i.e., both sets are
not empty), the patch replaces at least one line.
Figure 11 shows an example of a patch which fixes a
bug of converting a String List into a String Array.
Fragb is the line that starts with - while Fragf is the lines
that start with +.
By analyzing the differences between the buggy code
and the fixing code of the patch in Figure 11, the patch
can be manually summarized as an abstract representation
shown in Figure 12 which could be used to address similar
bugs. Abstract representation indicates that specific identi-
fiers and types are abstracted from concrete representation.
Abstract patch representations can be formally defined
as fix patterns. Coccinelle [51] and its semantic patches
provide a metavariable example of how fix patterns can
be leveraged to systematically apply common patches, e.g.,
to address collateral evolution due to API changes [52].
Manually summarizing fix patterns from patches is however
time-consuming. Thus, we are investigating an automated
approach of mining fix patterns. To that end, we first pro-
vide a formal definition of a fix pattern.
Definition 5. Fix Pattern (FP): A fix pattern is a pair of a code
context extracted from a buggy code block and a set of change
operations, which can be applied to a given buggy code block
to generate fixing code. This can be formalized as:
FP = (Ctx,CO) (5)
where Ctx represents the code context that is an abstract rep-
resentation of the buggy code block. CO is a set of change
operations (See Definition 6) to be applied to modifying the
buggy code block.
Definition 6. Change Operation (O): A change operation is
a three-value tuple which contains a change action, a source
code entity and a set of sub change operations. This can be
formalized as:
O = (Action, Sce, CO) (6)
where Action is an element of an action set (i.e., {UPD,
DEL, INS, MOV}) working on the entity (Sce). UPD is an
update action which means updating the target entity, DEL is
a delete action which denotes deleting the target entity, INS
is an insert action which represents inserting a new entity,
and MOV is a move action which indicates moving the target
entity. CO is a set of sub change operations working on the
sub entities of the current action’s entity. When an operation
acts on a leaf node entity, CO = ∅.
A Set of Change Operations:
o1. (UPD, (ReturnStatement, return), [
o2.    (UPD, (CastExpression, (String[])), [
o3.        (UPD, (MethodInvocation, list.toArray), [
o4.            (UPD, (Method, toArray), [
o5.                (UPD, (ArrayCreation, String), [
o6.                    (DEL, (ArraySize, NumberLiteral), ∅)
o7.                    (INS, (MethodInvocation, list.size), [
o8.                        (INS, (Variable, list), ∅),
o9.                        (INS, (Method, size), ∅)])])])])])])
Fig. 10: A set of change operations of the patch in Figure 11.
For example, Figure 10 shows the set of change opera-
tions of the patch in Figure 11. o1 is the change operation
working on the root entity ReturnStatement. UPD is
the Action, (ReturnStatement, return) is the root entity
being acted, and o2 is the sub change operation acting on
the sub entity CastExpression of the root entity. It is the
same as others. o6, o8, and o9 are the change operations
working on leaf node entities. So that, the sets of their sub
change operations are null.
A fix pattern is used as a guide to fix a bug. The
fixing process is defined as a bug fix process presented in
Appendix A for interested readers.
2.5.2 Pattern mining process
Figure 11 shows a concrete patch that can only be used to
fix related specific bugs as it limits the syntax and semantic
structure of the buggy code. The statement is limited to
be a Return Statement and the parameterized type of
the List and the Array is also limited to String. Addi-
tionally, the variable name list can also interfere with the
matching between this patch and similar bugs. However,
the abstract patch in Figure 12 abstracts the aforementioned
interferon, which can be matched with various mutations
of the bug converting a List into an Array. Hence, it is
necessary to mine common patch patterns from massive and
various patches for specific bugs.
DiffEntry of a patch:
@@ -1246,1 +1246,1 @@
- return (String[]) list.toArray(new String[0]);
+ return (String[]) list.toArray(
+ new String[list.size()]);
Fig. 11: Example of a patch taken from FilenameUtils.java file
within Commit 09a6cb in project commons-io10.
Our conjecture is that common fix patterns can be mined
from large change sets. Exposed bugs are indeed generally
10https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-io/
9Abstract representation of a patch:
@
var: a list variable.
T: the parameterized type of a list.
@
- (T[]) var.toArray(new T[0]);
+ (T[]) var.toArray(new T[var.size()])
Fig. 12: Example of an abstract representation of the patch in
Figure 11.
not new and common fix patterns may be an immediate
and appropriate way to address them automatically. For
example, when discussing the deluge of buggy mobile
software, Andy Chou, a co-designer of the Coverity bug
finding tool, reported that, based on his experience, the
found bugs are nothing new and are “actually well-known
and well-understood in the development community - the
same use after free and buffer overflow defects we have seen
for decades” [10]. In this vein, we design an approach to
mine common fix patterns for static analysis violations by
extracting changes that represent developers’ manual cor-
rections. Figure 9 illustrates our process for mining common
fix patterns.
Data Preprocessing.
As defined in Definition 5, a fix pattern contains a set of
change operations, which can be inferred by comparing the
buggy and fixed versions of source code files. In our study,
code changes of a patch are described as a set of change
operations in the form of Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) dif-
ferences (i.e., AST diffs). In contrast with GNU diffs, which
represent code changes as a pure text-based line-by-line edit
script, AST diffs provide a hierarchical representation of the
changes applied to the different code entities at different
levels (statements, expressions, and elements). We leverage
the open source GumTree [16] tool to extract and describe
change operations implemented in patches. GumTree, and
its associated source code, is publicly available, allowing
for replication and improvement, and is built on top of the
Eclipse Java model11.
All patches are tokenized into textual vectors by travers-
ing their AST-level diff tree with the deep-first search algo-
rithm and extracting the action string (e.g., UPD), the entity
type (e.g., ReturnStatement) and the entity identifier (e.g.,
return) as tokens of a change action (e.g., UPD ReturnState-
ment return). A given patch is thus represented as a list of
such tokens, further embedded and vectorized as a numeric
vector using the same method described in Section 2.4.3.
Fix Patterns Mining.
Patches can be considered as a special kind of natural
language text, which programmers leverage daily to request
and communicate changes in their community. Currently
available patch tools only perform directly the specified
operations (e.g., remove and add lines for GNU diff) so
far without the interpretation of what the changes are
about. Although all patches can be parsed and converted
into two-dimensional numeric vectors, it is still challenging
to mine fix patterns given that noisy change information
11http://www.vogella.com/tutorials/EclipseJDT/article.html
(e.g., specific changes) can interfere with identifying similar
patches. Thus, our method is designed to effectively learn
discriminating features of patches for mining fix patterns.
Similarly to the case of violation code pattern mining, we
leverage CNNs to perform deep learning of patch features
with preprocessed patches, and X-means clustering algo-
rithm to automatically cluster similar patches together with
learned features. Finally, we manually label each cluster
with fix patterns of violations abstracted from clustered
patches to show fix patterns clearly.
3 EMPIRICAL STUDY
3.1 Datasets
We consider project subjects based on a curated database of
Github.com provided through GHTorrent [53]. We select
projects satisfying three constraining criteria: (1) a project
has, at least, 50012 commits, (2) its main language is Java,
and (3) it is unique, i.e., not a fork of another project.
As a result, 2014 projects are initially collected. We then
filter out projects which are not automatically built with
Apache Maven. Subsequently, for each project, we execute
FindBugs on the compiled13 code of its revisions (i.e.,
committed version). If a project has at least two revisions
in which FindBugs can successfully identify violations, we
apply the tracking procedure described in Section 2.2 to
collecting data.
Table 1 shows the number of projects and violations used
in this study. There are 730 projects with 291,615 commits
where 250,387,734 violations are detected; these violations
are associated with 400 types defined by FindBugs. After
applying our violation tracking method presented in Sec-
tion 2.2 to these violations, as a result, 16,918,530 distinct
violations are identified.
TABLE 1: Subjects used in this study.
# Projects 730
# Commits 291,615
# Violations (detected) 250,387,734
# Distinct violations 16,918,530
# Violations types 400
3.2 Statistics on detected violations
We start our study by quickly investigating RQ1: “to what ex-
tent do violations recur in projects?”. We focus on three aspects
of violations: number of occurrences, spread in projects
and category distributions. Given that such statistics are
merely confirming natural distributions of the phenomenon
of defects, we provide all the details in the Appendix B of
this paper. Interested readers can also directly refer to the
replication package (including code and data) at :
https://github.com/FixPattern/findbugs-violations.
12A minimum number of commits is necessary to collect a sufficient
number of violations, which will be used for violation tracking.
13FindBugs runs on compiled bytecode (cf. Section 2.1).
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Overall, we have found that around 10% of violation
types are related to about 80% of violation occurrences.
However, only 200 violation types are spread over
more than 100 projects (i.e., 14% of the subjects), and
some violation types which are the most widespread
(i.e., top-50) actually have less occurrences than lesser
widespread ones. Finally, although most violation types
defined by FindBugs are related to Correctness, the clear
majority (66%) of violation occurrences are associated
with Dodgy Code and Bad Practice. Security-related vio-
lations account only for 0.5% of violation occurrences,
although they are widespread across 30% of projects.
3.3 What types of violations are fixed?
Although overall statistics of violation detections show that
there is variety in recurrence of violations, we must investi-
gate what types of violations are fixed by developers? (RQ2). We
provide in Appendix C more details on the following three
sub-questions that are considered to thoroughly answer this
question.
• RQ2-1: Which types of violations are developers most
concerned about?
• RQ2-2: Are fixed violations per type proportional to all
detected violation?
• RQ2-3: What is the distribution of fixed violations per
category?
We refer the interested reader to this part for more
statistics and detailed insights.
Overall, we have identified 88,927 violation instances
which have been fixed by developer code changes. We note
that we could not identify fixes for some 69 (i.e., 17%)
types of violations, nor in 183 (i.e., 25%) projects. Given the
significantly low proportion of violations that eventually get
fixed, we postulate that some violation types must represent
programming issues that are neglected by the large majority
of developers. Another plausible explanation is the limited
use of violation checkers such as FindBugs in the first place
since 36% (273) of the projects associated with FindBugs
include at least one commit referring to the FindBugs tool,
and 1,944 (2% of 88,927) cases where the associated commit
messages refer to FindBugs.
Only a small fraction of violations are fixed by devel-
opers. This suggests these violations are related to a
potentially high false positive ratio in the static analysis
tool, or lack developer interest due to their minor sever-
ity. There is thus a necessity to implement a practical
prioritization of violations.
With respect to RQ2-1, we find that only 50 violation
types, i.e., 15% of the fixed violation types, are associated
with 80% of the fixed violations, and only 63 (19%) fixed
violation types are appearing in at least 10% of the projects.
Developers appear to be concerned about only a few
number of violation types. The top-2 fixed violation
types (SIC_INNER_SHOULD_BE_STATIC_ANON14 and
DLS_DEAD_LOCAL_STORE15) are respectively perfor-
mance and Dodgy code issues.
With respect to RQ2-2, we compute a fluctuation ra-
tio metric which, for a given violation type, assesses the
differences of ranking in terms of detection and in terms
of fixes. Indeed a given violation type may account for
a very high x% of all violation detections, but account
for only a low y% (i.e., y  x). Or vice versa. This
metric allows to better perceive how violations can be
prioritized: for example, we identified 4 violation types,
including NM_CLASS_NAMING_CONVENTION16, have fluctuation
ratio values higher than 10, suggesting that, although
they have high occurrence rates, they have lower fix
rates by developers. On the other hand, violation type
NP_NONNULL_RETURN_VIOLATION17 has an inversed fluctuation
ratio of over 20, suggesting that although it has low oc-
currences in detection, it has a high priority to be fixed by
developers.
Our detailed study of the differences between detection
and fix ratios provides data and insights to build detec-
tion report and fix prioritization strategies of violations.
Finally, with respect RQ2-3, our investigations revealed
that the top-50 fixed violation types are largely dominated
by Dodgy code, Performance and Bad Practice categories.
Although Correctness overall regroups the largest number
(33%) of fixed violation types, its types have, each, a low
number of fix occurrences. Interestingly, Internationaliza-
tion is also a common fixed category, with 6,719 fixed
instances across 347 (63.3%) projects, with only two types
(DM_CONVERT_CASE18 and DM_DEFAULT_ENCODING19) which are
among top-5 most occurring violation types and among top-
10 most widespread throughout projects).
Overall, Dodgy code, Performance, and Bad Practice issues
are the most addressed by developers. Correctness is-
sues, however, although they are with to the majority
of fixed types, developers fail to address a large portion
of them. Compared to Internationalization, which are
straightforward and resolved uniformly, the statistics
suggest that developers could accept to fix Correctness
issues if there were tool support.
3.4 Comparison against other empirical studies on
FindBugs violations
The literature includes a number of studies related to
FindBugs violations. While our work includes such a
study, it is substantially more comprehensive and is based
on more representative subjects. As presented in Table 2,
our study collects data from 730 real-world projects (i.e., in
the wild) where 400 violation types (of 9 categories) can be
found. Other studies have only considered overall only 3
real-world projects. Vetro et al. [54] collect data from 301
projects, but they are in-the-lab projects which may not
14Inner class could be refactored into a named static inner class.
15Dead store to local variable.
16Class names should start with an upper case letter.
17Method may return null, but is declared @Nonnull.
18Consider using Locale parameterized version of invoked method.
19Reliance on default encoding.
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be representative of real-world development. Ayewah et
al. [15] only investigated some (< 100) Correctness-related
violations. Fixit [55] studied violations at the category level
and limited violations into six categories. Vetro et al. [54]
studied 77 violation types but ignored violation categories.
TABLE 2: Comparison of empirical studies on FindBugs
violations.
Our study Ayewah et al. [15] Fixit [55] Vetro et al. [54]
Projects 730 projectsin the wild
Two projects
in the wild
One student project,
One project in the wild
301 projects
in the lab
# types 400 < 100 - 77
# categories 9 (all of them) 1 (Correctness) 6 -
# detected cases 16,918,530 1,506 10,479 1,692
# fixed cases 88,927 518 640 -
Objective Fix pattern mining Evaluating staticanalysis warnings
Look into the value
of static analysis
Assess percentage and
type of violations
Additionally, our study investigates detected violation
distributions from three aspects: occurrences, spread, and
categories, which provides three different metrics to prior-
itize violations. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the
false positives of FindBugs could threaten the reliability
of violation prioritization based on the statistics of detected
violations. Previous studies [15], [54], [55] do not discuss this
aspect. To reduce this threat, we further investigate distri-
butions of fixed violations, which represent violations that
attract developer attention for resolution, thus suggesting
higher probabilities for true positives. Our results provide
more reliable prioritization metrics for violations reporting.
We further note that these studies focused on objectives
that are different from ours. Ayewah et al. [15] focused on
evaluating the importance of static analysis warnings in
production software. In Fixit [55], the authors looked into
the value of FindBugs on finding program issues. Vetro et
al. [54] aimed at assessing the percentage and type of issues
of FindBugs that are actual defects. After going through
their research tracks, our work could be applied to their
research questions, but our eventual goal is to mine fix
patterns for FindBugs violations.
3.5 Code Patterns Mining
Empirical findings on violation tracking across the projects
showed that only a small fraction of violations are fixed
by developers. Thus, overall, the distribution of unfixed
violations follow that of detection violations. We now inves-
tigate the research question what kinds of patterns do unfixed
and fixed violations have respectively? (RQ3), focusing on the
following sub-questions:
• RQ3-1: What are the common code patterns for unfixed
violations and fixed ones respectively?
• RQ3-2: What is the relationship or difference between
the common source code patterns of unfixed violations
and fixed ones?
• RQ3-3: What are possible reasons for some violations to
remain unfixed?
To avoid noise in the dataset due to varying distri-
butions, we focus on instances the instances of violations
where the violation types are among the top-50 types that
developers are concerned about (i.e., the most fixed ones).
Then, we apply the approach of mining code patterns pre-
sented in Section 2.4 to identify common code patterns of
unfixed violations and fixed ones respectively.
Disclaimer: Note that FindBugs produces a large
number of false positives in two ways: 1) locations of de-
tected violations can be incorrectly reported by FindBugs,
or 2) the detected violations are correctly located, but de-
velopers may still treat it as a false positive warning since
it could not be considered as a serious enough concern
to fix. While the second kind of false positives does not
threaten patterns mining, but the first kind does. To reduce
the threat to validity due to false positives related to in-
correct localization, we focus on the pattern mining process
on the recurrent fixed violations: their locations are most
likely correct given that developers manually checked and
addressed the issue.
3.5.1 Experiment Setup
FindBugs reports violations by specifying the start line
and the end line of the code hunk that is relevant to the
violation. Since it is challenging (and error-prone) to mine
code patterns by considering big code hunks, we limit
our experiments on small hunks. Figure 13 illustrates the
distribution of sizes (i.e., the code line numbers of hunks) of
the code hunks associated with all violations.
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Fig. 13: Hunk sizes’ distribution of all violations.
For 89% of the violations, the relevant code hunk is
limited to 10 code lines or less. We have further manually
observed that a line-based calculation of hunk size is not
reliable due to the presence of noise caused by comments,
annotations and unnecessary blank lines, so we select vio-
lations by their tokens. Figure 14 provides the distribution
of numbers of code tokens by violations. We discard outliers
and thus focus on violations where the code includes at most
40 tokens extracted based on their refined AST trees (cf. tree
B in Figure 7).
0 10 20 30 40
Token Vector Size of Each violation
Fig. 14: Sizes’ distribution of all violation token vectors.
Following the methodology described in Section 2.4,
violations are represented with numeric vectors using
Word2Vec with the following parameters (Size of vec-
tor = 300; Window size = 4; Min word frequency = 1)
Feature extraction is then implemented based on CNNs
whose parameters are listed in Table 3. The literature has
consistently reported that effective models for Word2Vec
and deep learning applications require well-tuned param-
eters [17], [56], [57], [58], [59]. In this study, all parameters
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of the two models are tuned through a visualizing network
training UI20 provided by DeepLearning4J.
TABLE 3: Parameters setting of CNNs.
Parameters Values
# nodes in hidden layers 1000
learning rate 1e-3
Optimization algorithm stochastic gradient descent
pooling type max pool
activation (output layer ) softmax
activation (other layers) leakrelu
loss function mean squared logarithmic error
Finally, Weka’s [50] implementation of X-means cluster-
ing algorithm uses the extracted features to find similar code
for each violation type. Parameter settings for the clustering
are enumerated in Table 4.
TABLE 4: Parameters setting of X-means.
Parameters Values
Distance Function Euclidean Distance
KD Tree true
# max iterations 1000
# max K-means 500
# max K-means of children 500
# seed 500
# max clusters 500
# min clusters 1
3.5.2 Code Patterns
Given that violation code fragments are represented in the
generic form of an AST, we can automatically mine patterns
by simply considering the most recurring fragment in a
cluster yielded by our approach as the pattern. We then
manually assess each pattern to assign a label to it. We
investigate code patterns on fixed violations and unfixed
ones respectively. Overall, while unfixed violations yield a
few more patterns than fixed violations, we find that most
patterns are shared by both unfixed and fixed sets. Table 5
shows some examples of identified common code patterns
of 10 violation types.
We manually checked the patterns yielded for the top-50
violation types and assessed these patterns with respect to
FindBugs’ documentation. For example, DM_NUMBER_CTOR
violation refers to the use of a number constructor to create
a number object, which is inefficient [14]. For instance,
using new Integer(...) is guaranteed to always result in a
new Integer object whereas Integer.valueOf(...) allows
caching of values to be done by the compiler, class library,
or JVM. Using cached values can avoid object allocation
and the code will be faster. Our mined patterns are the
five types of number creations with number constructors.
DM_FP_NUMBER_CTRO has the similar patterns with it. This
example shows how violation code patterns mined with
our approach are consistent with the static analysis tool
documentation. We have carefully checked the patterns for
the top-50 violation types, and found that for 76%, the
patterns are adequate with respect to the documentation.
Appendix D provides details on 10 example violation types.
20https://deeplearning4j.org/visualization
Our code pattern mining approach yields patterns that
are consistent with the violation descriptions in docu-
mentation of the static analysis tool.
We focused our investigations on some of the patterns
that are yielded only from unfixed violation code, and found
that in some cases, there are inconsistencies between the
pattern and the bug description provided by FindBugs.
First, we consider a case where the number of patterns
discovered for a given violation type exceeds the number
of cases enumerated by FindBugs in its documentation.
MS_SHOULD_BE_FINAL is a violation type raised when the
analyzer encounters a static field that is public but not
final: such a field could be changed by malicious code
or accidentally from another package [14]. Besides public
static field declarations, the identified patterns on violation
code of this type include protected static field declarations,
which is inconsistent with the description by FindBugs.
Figure 15 shows an example of such inconsistent detec-
tion by FindBugs in project BroadleafCommerce. When
developers confront FindBugs’ warning message against
their code, they may decide not to address such an undocu-
mented bug.
Violation Type:
MS_SHOULD_BE_FINAL
Violation Code:
protected static String FACETS_ATTRIBUTE_NAME =
"facets";
Fig. 15: Example of a detected MS_SHOULD_BE_FINAL viola-
tion, taken from project BroadleafCommerce21.
Second, we consider a case where the mined pattern
is inconsistent with the documentation of the violation.
RI_REDUNDANT_INTERFACES is a warning on a class which
implements an interface that has already been implemented
by one of the class’ super classes [14]. Its mined com-
mon code pattern is associated to a super constructor
invocation. However, the violation location is positioned
on the class declaration line. After manually checking
some RI_REDUNDANT_INTERFACES cases, we find that the Java
classes with RI_REDUNDANT_INTERFACES violations indeed
have a redundant interface(s) in their class declaration code
part. However, some detected RI_REDUNDANT_INTERFACES
violations locate on the super constructor invocations but
not the class declaration code, which could confuse devel-
opers and increase the perception of high false positives
rates. For example, in Figure 16, the exact position of the
RI_REDUNDANT_INTERFACES violation should be the “imple-
ments Serializable” part (L-33). FindBugs however reports
the position at L-49 (highlighted with red background)
which is not precise and can even confuse developers on
why the code is a violation and how to resolve it.
21https://github.com/BroadleafCommerce/BroadleafCommerce
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TABLE 5: Common code pattern examples of violations.
Violation Type Common Source Code Pattern(s)
DM CONVERT CASE 1 stringExp.toLowerCase(), 2 stringExp.toUpperCase().
RCN REDUNDANT NULLCHECK OF NONNULL VALUE 1 if (exp == null ...) {...}, 2 if (exp != null ...) {...},
3 exp == null ? exp1 : exp2, 4 exp != null ? exp1 : exp2.
BC UNCONFIRMED CAST 1 T1 v1 = (T1) v2/exp, 2 v1 = (T1) v2/exp, 3 ((T1) v2).exp.
MS SHOULD BE FINAL public/protected static T1 v1 = exp.
RV RETURN VALUE IGNORED BAD PRACTICE 1 fileExpe.mkdirs(), 2 fileExpe.mkdir(), 3 fileExpe.delete(),
4 fileExpe.createNewFile(), 5 other exp.method invoation() returns a value.
DM NUMBER CTOR 1 new Long(...), 2 new Integer(...), 3 new Short(...),
4 new Byte(...), 5 new Char(...).
SBSC USE STRINGBUFFER CONCATENATION 1 stringVariable += stringExp, 2 stringVariable = stringExp1 + stringExp2.
DM BOXED PRIMITIVE FOR PARSING 1 Integer.valueOf(str), 2 Long.valueOf(str).
PZLA PREFER ZERO LENGTH ARRAYS return null.
ES COMPARING STRINGS WITH EQ 1 stringExp1 == stringExp2, 2 stringExp1 != stringExp2.
Violation Type:
RI_REDUNDANT_INTERFACES
Violation Code:
L-33 public abstract class AbstractFormat extends
NumberFormat implements Serializable {
......
L-48 protected AbstractFormat() {
L-49 this(getDefaultNumberFormat());
}
Fig. 16: Example of a miss-located RI_REDUNDANT_
INTERFACES violation, taken from commit 84a642 in project
commons-math.
Some violations remain unfixed as a result of their
imprecise detection. False positives in FindBugs can
be improved by addressing some issues with accurate
reporting of violation locations, as well as updating the
documentation.
Finally, we note that it is challenging to identify common
code patterns for some violation types for two main reasons.
First, some clusters are too small, indicating that the
violation instances, despite the abstraction with AST, are
too specific. For example, DLS_DEAD_LOCAL_STORE violations
are about variable assignments which are specific oper-
ators in source code. It is challenging to identify any
common code pattern except for the pattern, variable as-
signment statement, identified at the level of AST node
types. With this information alone, it is practically im-
possible to figure out why a code fragment is related
to a DLS_DEAD_LOCAL_STORE violation. This is a potential
reason why some DLS_DEAD_LOCAL_STORE violations remain
unfixed.
Second, again, FindBugs cannot locate some violations
accurately. We enumerate three scenarios:
• The detected violation code is the method
body but not the method name. For example,
NM_METHOD_NAMING_CONVENTION violations violate the
method naming convention but not method bodies,
however the source code of these violations tracked with
their position provided by FindBugs is the method
bodies. Similar source code can be clustered into the same
cluster to identify some patterns which cannot explain
how the violation is induced, but could help interpret the
behavior of these methods. Actually, the method name
is the abstract description of method body, so we think
that it is inefficient to identify the violation of method
names by their naming convention without considering
the behavior of method bodies.
• The second case is that the source code of
violations is irrelevant source code. For instance,
UWF_FIELD_NOT_INITIALIZED_IN_CONSTRUCTOR indicates
that a field is never initialized within any constructor,
loaded and referenced without a null check [14].
According to observing the instances of this violation
type, the source code of these violations is the statements
of one method body in these violated Java class, which
is irrelevant to the violation type. Some similar source
code can be clustered together to obtain some patterns
which still cannot explain the violation type. Therefore, it
is inconsistent with the bug description of this type.
• The third case is that the violation locates on
class body rather the declaration of class name.
SE_NO_SERIALVERSIONID means the current violated Java
class implements the Serializable interface, but does
not define a serialVersionUID field [14]. The positions
of this kind of violations provided by FindBugs are
located in the class body. It is impossible to identify the
common code patterns of this violation type which can
interpret why the source code makes the violations.
These inaccurate localized violations could mislead or
confuse developers, which may cause that developers do
not prefer to fix these kinds of violations. In this study,
we re-locate the violations of serialVersionUID and
RI_REDUNDANT_INTERFACES to class declarations. Combin-
ing the results with source code changes of type-related
fixed violations, it is easy to follow why the source code
fragment is a violation. Figure 17 shows an example
of fixing a RI_REDUNDANT_INTERFACES violation. Interface
java.util.Map has been implemented in the super class
AbstractMap of the current class Map. Thus, it is fixed by
removing the redundent java.util.Map interface.
22https://github.com/datanucleus/datanucleus-core
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Violation Type: RI_REDUNDANT_INTERFACES
Fixing Patch:
public class Map extends AbstractMap implements
- java.util.Map, SCOMap<java.util.Map>,
+ SCOMap<java.util.Map>,
Cloneable, java.io.Serializable {
Fig. 17: Example of a fixed RI_REDUNDANT_INTERFACES viola-
tion, taken from commit ea876b in datanucleus-core22
project.
Many violation types are associated with code from
which patterns can be inferred. Such patterns are rele-
vant for immediately understanding how violations are
induced. For some other violations code however it is
difficult to mine patterns, partly due to the limitation
of FindBugs and the fact that the code fragment is too
specific.
3.6 Fix Patterns Mining
We now investigate our ultimate research question on how
are the violations resolved if fixed? (RQ4). To that end, we first
dissect the violation fixing changes and propose to cluster
relevant fixes to infer common fix patterns following the
CNN-based approach described in Section 2.5.
We curate our dataset of 88,927 violation fixing changes
by filtering out changes related to:
• 4,682 violations localized in test files. Indeed, we focus on
mining patterns related to developer changes on actual
program code.
• 7,010 violations whose fix do not involve a modification in
the violation location file. This constraint, which excludes
cases where long data flow may require a fixing change
in other files, is dictated by our automation strategy for
computing the AST edit script, which is simplified by
focusing on the violation location file.
• 7,121 violations where the associated fix changes are not
local to the method body of the violation.
• 25,464 violations where the fixing changes are applied
relatively far away from the violation location. We con-
sider that the corresponding AST edit script matches if
the change actions are performed within ±3 lines of the
violation location. This constraint conservatively helps to
further remove false positive cases of violations which are
actually not fixed but are identified as fixed violations due
to limitations in violation tracking.
• 9,060 violations whose code or whose fix code contain
a large number of tokens. In previous works, Herzig
et al. [60] and Kawrykow et al. [61] have found that
large source code change hunks generally address feature
additions, refactoring needs, etc., rather than bug fixes.
Pan et al. [62] also showed that large bug fix hunk pairs do
not contain meaningful bug fix patterns, and most bug fix
hunk pairs (91-96%) are small ones. Ignoring large hunk
pairs has minimal impact on analysis. Consequently, we
use the same threshold (i.e., 40, presented in Section 3.5)
of tokens to select fixed violations.
Overall, our fix pattern mining approach is applied to
35,590 violation fixing changes, which are associated with
288 violation types. Parameter values of Word2Vec, CNNs
and X-means are identical to those used for common code
patterns mining (cf. Section 3.5). In this study, once a cluster
of similar changes, for a given violation type, are found, we
can automatically mine the patterns based on the AST diffs.
Although approaches such as the computation of longest
common subsequence of repair actions could be used to
mine fix patterns, we observe that they do not always pro-
duce semantically meaningful patterns. Thus, we consider
a naive but empirically effective approach of inferring fix
patterns by considering the most recurring AST edit script
in a given cluster, i.e., the code change that occurs identically
the most. Finally, labels to each change pattern are assigned
manually after a careful assessment of the pattern relevance.
For the experiments, we focus on the top-50 fixed viola-
tion types for the mining of fix patterns. Table 6 summarizes
10 example cases of violation types with details, in natural
language, on the fix patterns.
Figure 18 presents an inferred pattern in terms of
AST edit script for violation type RCN_REDUNDANT_NULLCHECK
_OF_NONNULL_VALUE described in Table 6. For AST-level rep-
resentation of patterns of other violations, we refer the
reader to the replication package.
Overall, the pattern presented in AST edit script for-
mat, which should be translated into fix changes to “delete
the null check expression” requires some code context to
be concretized. When the var23 != null expression is the
null-checking conditional expression of an IfStatement, the
concrete patch must delete the violated expression. Sim-
ilarly, when the exp == null expression is the condition
expression of an IfStatement, the patch also removes
the null-checking expression. When exp == null or exp !=
null expression is one of the condition expressions of an
IfStatement, the patch is deleting the violated expression.
This example shows the complexity of automatically gen-
erating patches from abstract fix patterns, an entire research
direction which is left for future work. For now, we generate
the patches manually based on the mined fix patterns.
Our proposed fix pattern mining approach can effec-
tively cluster similar changes of fixing violations to-
gether. And the fix pattern mining protocol is applicable
to derive meaningful patterns.
Listing 1: Violation types failed to be identified fix pattern
1. UWF_FIELD_NOT_INITIALIZED_IN_CONSTRUCTOR
2. SF_SWITCH_NO_DEFAULT
3. UWF_UNWRITTEN_FIELD
4. IS2_INCONSISTENT_SYNC
5. VA_FORMAT_STRING_USES_NEWLINE
6. SQL_PREPARED_STATEMENT_GENERATED_FROM_NONCONSTANT_STRING
7. OBL_UNSATISFIED_OBLIGATION
8. OBL_UNSATISFIED_OBLIGATION_EXCEPTION_EDGE
9. OS_OPEN_STREAM
10.OS_OPEN_STREAM_EXCEPTION_PATH
11.ODR_OPEN_DATABASE_RESOURCE
12.NP_PARAMETER_MUST_BE_NONNULL_BUT_MARKED_AS_NULLABLE
Listing 1 enumerates 12 violation types for which our
mining approach could not yield patterns, given that the
number of samples per cluster was small, or that within a
23var represents any variable being checked.
24https://github.com/apache/pdfbox
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TABLE 6: Common fix pattern examples of fixed violations.
Violation Type Fix Pattern(s)
DM CONVERT CASE ADD a rule of Locale.ENGLISH into toLowerCase()/toUpperCase().
RCN REDUNDANT NULLCHECK OF NONNULL VALUE 1 Delete the null check expression. 2 Delete the null check IfStatement.
BC UNCONFIRMED CAST 1 Delete the violated statement, 2 Delete the cast type,
3 Replace CastExpression with a null value.
MS SHOULD BE FINAL Add a “final” modifier.
RV RETURN VALUE IGNORED BAD PRACTICE 1 Add an IfStatement to check the return value of violated source code.
2 Replace violated expression with a new method invocation.
DM NUMBER CTOR Replace the number constructor with a static number.valueOf() method.
SBSC USE STRINGBUFFER CONCATENATION Replace the String type with the StringBuilder, and replace plus operator ofStringVarialbe with the append method of StringBuilder.
DM BOXED PRIMITIVE FOR PARSING Replace Number.valueOf() with Number.parseXXX() method.
PZLA PREFER ZERO LENGTH ARRAYS 1 Delete the buggy statement, 2 Replace the null value with an empty array.
ES COMPARING STRINGS WITH EQ Replace the “==” or “!=” InfixExpression with a equals() method invocation.
DiffEntry of a patch:
- if (dictionaryObject!=null && !onlyEmptyFields){
+ if (!onlyEmptyFields) {
signatures.put(new COSObjectKey(dict),
(COSDictionary)dict.getObject());
}
Repair actions parsed by GumTree at AST level:
UPD IfStatement@@if(dictionaryObject!=null &&
!onlyEmptyFields)
---UPD InfixExpression@@dictionaryObject!=null &&
!onlyEmptyFields
------DEL InfixExpression@@dictionaryObject!=null
---------DEL VariableName@@dictionaryObject
---------DEL Operator@@!=
---------DEL NullLiteral@@null
------DEL Operator@@&&
Inferred Fix Pattern:
UPD IfStatement@@if(Null-Check-Expression
Operator Other-Expression)
---UPD InfixExpression@@Null-Check-Expression
Operator Other-Expression
------DEL Null-Check-Expression
------DEL Operator
Fig. 18: Example of a fix pattern for RCN_REDUNDANT_NULL
CHECK_OF_NONNULL_VALUE violation inferred from a viola-
tion fix instance taken from commit a41eb9 in project
apache-pdfbox24.
cluster we could not find strictly redundant change actions
sequences. Our observations of such cases revealed the
following causes of failure in fix pattern mining:
• violations can be fixed by adding completely new node
types. For example, one fix pattern of RV_RETURN_VALUE_
IGNORED_BAD_PRACTICE violations is replacing the violated
expression with a method invocation which encapsulates
the detailed source code changes.
• violations can occur on specific source code fragments
from which it is even difficult to mine patterns. Fixes for
such violations generally do not share commonalities.
• violations can have fix changes applied in separate region
than the violation code location. Since we did not consider
such cases for the mining, we systematically miss bottom-
7 violation types of Listing 1 which are in this case.
• violations can be associated to a String literal. For
example, we observe that the fixing changes of
VA_FORMAT_STRING_USES_NEWLINE violations are replacing
“\n” with “%n” within strings. Unfortunately, our AST
nodes are focused on compilable code tokens, and thus
changes in String literal are ignored to guarantee suffi-
cient abstraction from concrete patches.
3.7 Usage and effectiveness of fix patterns
We finally investigate whether fix patterns can actually help
resolve violations in practice? (RQ5). To that end, we consider
the following sub-questions:
• RQ5-1: Can fix patterns be applied to automate the
management of some unfixed violations?
• RQ5-2: Can fix patterns be leveraged as ingredients for
automated repair of buggy programs?
• RQ5-3: Can fix patterns be effective in systematizing the
resolution of FindBugs violations in the wild?
We recall that our work automates the generation of fix
patterns. Patch generation is out of scope, and thus will
be performed manually (based on the mined fix patterns),
taking into account the code context.
3.7.1 Resolving unfixed violations
We apply fix patterns to a subset of unfixed violations in our
subjects following the process illustrated in Figure 19. For a
given unfix violation, we search for the top-k25 most suitable
fix patterns to generate patches. To that end, we consider
cosine similarity between the violation code features vector
(built with CNNs in Section 2.4.3) and the features vector of
the centroid fixed violation in the cluster associated to each
fix pattern.
A fix pattern is regarded as a true positive fix pattern
for an unfixed violation, if a patch candidate derived from
this pattern is addressing the violation. We check this by
ensuring that the resulting program after applying the
patch candidates passes compilation and all tests, FindBugs
no longer raises a warning at this location, and manual
checking by the authors has not revealed any inappropriate
change of semantics in program behaviour.
Test data: We collect a subset of unfixed violations
in the top-50 fixed violation types (described in Section 3.5)
as the testing data of this experiment to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of fixed patterns. For each violation type, at most
10 unfixed violation instances, which are the most similar to
the centroids of the corresponding fixed violations clusters,
are selected as the evaluation subjects.
Results: Table 7 presents summary statistics on un-
fixed violations resolved by our mined fix patterns. Over-
all, among the selected 500 unfixed violations in the test
25k = 10 in our experiments
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Fig. 19: Overview of fixing similar violations with fix patterns.
TABLE 7: Unfixed-violations resolved by fix patterns.
Violation types Top 1 Top 5 Top 10 Total
RI REDUNDANT INTERFACES 10 10 10 10
SE NO SERIALVERSIONID 10 10 10 10
UPM UNCALLED PRIVATE METHOD 10 10 10 10
DM NUMBER CTOR 9 10 10 10
DM FP NUMBER CTOR 9 10 10 10
DM BOXED PRIMITIVE FOR PARSING 8 9 10 10
DM CONVERT CASE 7 9 10 10
MS SHOULD BE FINAL 7 9 9 10
PZLA PREFER ZERO LENGTH ARRAYS 7 7 8 10
RCN REDUNDANT NULLCHECK WOULD
HAVE BEEN A NPE
6 8 8 10
RV RETURN VALUE IGNORED BAD PRACTICE 6 7 8 10
SBSC USE STRINGBUFFER CONCATENATION 4 10 10 10
MS PKGPROTECT 4 9 9 10
EI EXPOSE REP2 4 4 5 10
DM DEFAULT ENCODING 4 5 5 10
WMI WRONG MAP ITERATOR 3 7 9 10
UC USELESS CONDITION 3 6 6 10
ES COMPARING STRINGS WITH EQ 2 8 10 10
RCN REDUNDANT NULLCHECK OF NONNULL VALUE 3 4 4 10
SIC INNER SHOULD BE STATIC ANON 3 3 3 10
UCF USELESS CONTROL FLOW 2 9 10 10
BC UNCONFIRMED CAST OF RETURN VALUE 2 4 4 10
DLS DEAD LOCAL STORE 2 3 4 10
NP NULL ON SOME PATH 1 5 7 10
BC UNCONFIRMED CAST 1 1 1 10
UC USELESS OBJECT 0 8 8 10
NP NULL ON SOME PATH FROM RETURN VALUE 0 3 5 10
VA FORMAT STRING USES NEWLINE 0 0 0 10
UWF FIELD NOT INITIALIZED IN CONSTRUCTOR 0 0 0 10
DE MIGHT IGNORE 0 0 0 10
EI EXPOSE REP 0 0 0 10
IS2 INCONSISTENT SYNC 0 0 0 10
NM METHOD NAMING CONVENTION 0 0 0 10
NP LOAD OF KNOWN NULL VALUE 0 0 0 10
NP NONNULL RETURN VIOLATION 0 0 0 10
NP PARAMETER MUST BE NONNULL
BUT MARKED AS NULLABLE
0 0 0 10
OBL UNSATISFIED OBLIGATION 0 0 0 10
OBL UNSATISFIED OBLIGATION EXCEPTION EDGE 0 0 0 10
ODR OPEN DATABASE RESOURCE 0 0 0 10
OS OPEN STREAM 0 0 0 10
OS OPEN STREAM EXCEPTION PATH 0 0 0 10
REC CATCH EXCEPTION 0 0 0 10
RV RETURN VALUE IGNORED NO SIDE EFFECT 0 0 0 10
SF SWITCH NO DEFAULT 0 0 0 10
SIC INNER SHOULD BE STATIC 0 0 0 10
SQL PREPARED STATEMENT GENERATED
FROM NONCONSTANT STRING
0 0 0 10
ST WRITE TO STATIC FROM INSTANCE METHOD 0 0 0 10
URF UNREAD PUBLIC OR PROTECTED FIELD 0 0 0 10
URF UNREAD FIELD 0 0 0 10
UWF UNWRITTEN FIELD 0 0 0 10
Total 127(25.4%) 188(37.6%) 203(40.6%) 500
Identified fix patterns are applied to fixing a subset of unfixed violations in our
subjects.
data, 127 (25.4%) are fixed by the most similar matched
fix patterns (i.e., top-1), 188 (37.6%) are fixed by a pattern
among the top-5, and 203 (40.6%) are fixed within the top-
10. The matched positive fix patterns mainly cluster on top-5
fix pattern candidates, which are a few less than the top-
10 range. This suggests that enlarging the search space of
fix pattern candidates cannot effectively find positive fix
patterns for more target violations.
Among the 203 fixed unfixed-violations, only 3 of
them are fixed by matched fix patterns collected across
violation types. We observe that DM_NUMBER_CTOR and
DM_FP_NUMBER_CTOR have similar fix patterns. We use the
fix patterns of DM_FP_NUMBER_CTOR to match fix pattern can-
didates for DM_NUMBER_CTOR violations. The fix patterns of
DM_FP_NUMBER_CTOR can fix the DM_NUMBER_CTOR violations,
and vice versa.
Almost half of the unfixed violations in a sampled
dataset can be systematically resolved with mined fix
patterns from similar violations fixed by developers. 1
out of 4 of these unfixed violations are immediately and
successfully fixed by the first selected fix pattern.
We note that fix patterns for 23 violation types are effec-
tive in resolving any of the related unfixed violations. There
are various reasons for this situation, notably related to the
specificity of some violation types and code, the imprecision
in FindBugs violation report, or the lack of patterns. We
provide detailed examples in Appendix E.
3.7.2 Fixing real bugs
We attempt to apply fix patterns to relevant faults docu-
mented in the Defects4J [20] collection of real-world defects
in Java programs. This dataset is largely used in studies of
program repair [63], [64], [65].
Test data: We run FindBugs on the 395 buggy
versions of the 6 Java projects used to establish Defects4J.
As a result, it turns out that 14 bugs can be detected as
static analysis violations detectable FindBugs. This is a
reasonable number since most of the bugs in Defects4J are
functional bugs which fail under specific test cases rather
than programming rule violations.
For each relevant bug, we consider the fix patterns
associated to their violation types, and manually generate
the patches. When the generated patch candidate can (1)
pass the failed test cases of the corresponding bug and
(2) FindBugs cannot identify any violation at the same
position, then the matched fix pattern is regarded as a
positive fix pattern for this bug.
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Results: Table 8 shows the results of this exper-
iment. 4 out of the 14 bugs are fixed with the mined
fix patterns and the generated patches by fix patterns are
semantically equivalent to the patches provided by devel-
opers for these bugs. The violations of 2 bugs are indeed
eliminated by fix patterns, but the generated patches lead to
new bugs (in terms of test suite pass). There are 2 bugs that
can be matched with fix patterns, but more context infor-
mation was necessary to fix them. For example, bug Lang23
is identified as a EQ_DOESNT_OVERRIDE_EQUALS violation and
matched with a fix pattern: overriding the equals(Obj o)
method. It is difficult to generate a patch of the bug with
this fix pattern without knowing the property values of the
object being compared. The remaining 6 (out of 14 bugs)
occurred on specific code, which is challenging to match
plausible fix patterns for them without any context.
TABLE 8: Fixed bugs in Defects4J with fix patterns.
Classification # bugs
Fixed bugs 4
Violations are removed but generates new bugs 2
Need more contexts 2
Failed to match plausible fix patterns 6
Total 14
Static analysis violations can represent real bugs that
make programs fail functional test cases. Our mined fix
patterns can contribute to automating the fix of such
bugs as experimented on the Defects4J dataset.
3.7.3 Systematically fixing FindBugs violations in the wild
We conduct a live study to evaluate the effectiveness of fix
patterns to systematize the resolutions of violations in open
source projects. We consider 10 open source Java projects
collected from Github.com on 30th September 2017 and
presented in Table 9. FindBugs is then run on compiled
versions of the associated programs to localize static analy-
sis violations.
TABLE 9: Ten open source Java projects.
Project Name # files # lines of code
json-simple 12 2,505
commons-io 117 28,541
commons-lang 148 77,577
commons-math 841 186,425
ant 859 219,506
cassandra 1,625 216,192
mahout 1,145 222,345
aries 1,570 216,646
poi 4,562 894,514
camel 8,119 1,079,671
Test data: We focus on violation instances in the top-
50 fixed violation types (presented in Section 3.3) are ran-
domly selected as our evaluating data. For each violation,
patches are generated manually in a similar process than the
previous experiments: a patch must lead to a program that
compiles, passes the test cases, and the previous violation
location should not be flagged by FindBugs anymore. For
each of such patch, we create a pull request and submit the
patch to the project developers.
Results: Overall, we managed to push 116 patches
to the developers of the 10 projects (cf. Table 10). 30 patches
have been ignored while 15 have been rejected. Neverthe-
less, 2 patches have been improved by developers and 67
have been immediately merged. 1 of our pull requests to
the json-simple project was not merged, but an identical
patch has been applied later by the developers to fix the
violation. Finally, the last patch (out the 116) has not been
applied yet, but was attached to the issue tracking system,
probably for later replacement.
TABLE 10: Results of live study.
Project Name # Patchespushed ignored rejected improved merged
json-simple 2 1 0 0 0
commons-io 2 0 2 0 0
commons-lang 7 5 1 1 0
commons-math 6 6 0 0 0
ant 16 2 4 1 9
cassandra 9 9 0 0 0
mahout 3 2 0 0 0
aries 5 5 0 0 0
poi 44 0 0 0 44
camel 22 0 8 0 14
Total† 116 30 15 2 67
†One patch of json-simple is the same as a patch of the
same violation which has been fixed by its developer in another
version. One patch of mahout is attached to its bug report
system but has not yet been merged.
Table 11 presents the distribution of delays before ac-
ceptance for the 69 accepted (merged + improved) patches.
67% of the patches are accepted within 1 day, while 97%
(67% +30%) are accepted within 2 days. Only 2 patches took
a longer time to get accepted. We note that this acceptance
delay is much shorter than the median distributions of the
three kinds of patches submitted for the Linux kernel [8].
TABLE 11: Delays until acceptance.
Delay less than 1 day 1 to 2 days 17 days
Number of Patches 46 (67%) 21 (30%) 2 (3%)
Acceptance indicates one of improved or merged patches.
As summarized in Table 12, we note that 21 accepted
patches were verified by at least two developers. Although
48 accepted patches were verified by only one developer,
we argue that this does not bias the results: first, the com-
mon source code patterns of these accepted fixed violation
types are consistent with the descriptions documented by
FindBugs; second, the matched fix patterns are likely ac-
ceptable by developers since the patterns are common in
fixing violations as mined in the revision histories of real-
world projects.
TABLE 12: Verification of accepted patches.
Verified by 1 developer 2 developers 3 developers
Number of Patches 48 19 2
Our mined fix patterns are effective to fix violations
in the wild. Furthermore, the generated patches are
eventually quickly accepted by developers.
The live study further yields a number of insights related
to static analysis violations.
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Insight 1. Well-maintained projects are not prone to vio-
lating commonly-addressed violation types. We note that
8 violation types (presented in Listing 2) do not ap-
pear at the current revisions of the selected 10 projects.
Type RI_REDUNDANT_INTERFACES occurs only one time in
json-simple project. This finding suggests that violation
recurrences may be time-varying, so that, there is a time-
variant issue of violation recurrences in revision histories of
software projects, which may help to prioritize violations. It
is included in our future work.
Listing 2: Violation types not seen in the selected 10 projects.
1. SIC_INNER_SHOULD_BE_STATIC
2. NM_METHOD_NAMING_CONVENTION
3. SIC_INNER_SHOULD_BE_STATIC_ANON
4. NP_PARAMETER_MUST_BE_NONNULL_BUT_MARKED_AS_NULLABLE
5. NP_NONNULL_RETURN_VIOLATION
6. UPM_UNCALLED_PRIVATE_METHOD
7. ODR_OPEN_DATABASE_RESOURCE
8. SE_NO_SERIALVERSIONID
Insight 2. Developers can write positive patches to fix
bugs existing in their projects based on the fix patterns
inferred with our method. For example, the developers
of commons-lang 26 project fixed a bug27 reported as a
DM_CONVERT_CASE violation by FindBugs by improving the
patch that was proposed using our method (cf. Figure 20).
Our method cannot generate the patch they wanted because
there is no fix pattern that is related to adding a rule
of Locale.ROOT in our dataset, so that there might be a
limitation of existing patches in revision histories.
The patch generated by fix patterns:
- final TimeZone tz = TimeZone.getTimeZone(
- value.toUpperCase());
+ final TimeZone tz = TimeZone.getTimeZone(
+ value.toUpperCase(Locale.ENGLISH));
The patch improved by developers:
- final TimeZone tz = TimeZone.getTimeZone(
- value.toUpperCase());
+ final TimeZone tz = TimeZone.getTimeZone(
+ value.toUpperCase(Locale.ROOT));
Fig. 20: Example of an improved patch in real project.
Insight 3. Developers will not accept plausible patches
that appear unnecessary even if those are likely to be
useful. For example, Figure 21 shows a rejected patch
that adds an instanceof test to the implementation of
equals(Object obj). The developers want to accept this
patch at the first glimpse, but they reject to change the
source code after reading the context of these violations
since the implementation of equals(Object obj) be-
longs to an inner static class which is only used in a generic
type that will not compare against other Object types.
Rejected Patch:
- return Arrays.equals(keys,((MultipartKey)obj).keys);
+ return obj instanceof MultipartKey &&
+ Arrays.equals(keys, ((MultipartKey)obj).keys);
Fig. 21: Example of a rejected patch in real projects.
Insight 4. Some violations fixed based on the mined fix
patterns may break the backward compatibility of other
26https://github.com/apache/commons-lang
27https://garygregory.wordpress.com/2015/11/03/
java-lowercase-conversion-turkey/
Rejected Patch breaks the backward compatibility:
-public static Path systemClasspath =
+public static final Path systemClasspath =
new Path(null,System.getProperty("java.class.path"));
Code @Line 1484 in InternalAntRunner.java in Eclipse project:
org.apache.tools.ant.types.Path.systemClasspath =
systemClasspath;
Fig. 22: Example of a rejected patch breaking the backward
compatibility.
A Patch makes program fail to checkstyle:
-public static String defaultCharset =
+public static final String defaultCharset =
ObjectHelper.getSystemProperty(
Exchange.DEFAULT_CHARSET_PROPERTY, "UTF-8");
Fig. 23: Example of a patch making program fail to checkstyle.
applications, leading developers to reject patches for such
violations. For example, Figure 22 shows a rejected patch
of a MS_SHOULD_BE_FINAL violation in Path.java file of the
ant project, which breaks the backward compatibility of
systemClasspath in InternalAntRunner class 28 of Eclipse
project.
Insight 5. Some violation types have low impact. For
example, PZLA_PREFER_ZERO_LENGTH_ARRAYS refers to the
FindBugs’ rule that an array-return method should con-
sider returning a zero-length array rather than null. Its fix
pattern is replacing the null reference with a corresponding
zero-length array. Developers ignored or rejected patches
for this type of violations because they do have null-check
to prevent these violations. If there is no null-check for
these violations, the invocations of these methods would be
identified as NP_NULL_ON_SOME_PATH violations. Thus, PZLA_
PREFER_ZERO_LENGTH_ARRAYS might not be useful in practice.
Insight 6. Some fix patterns make programs fail to com-
pile. For example, the common fix pattern of RV_RETURN_
VALUE_IGNORED_BAD_PRACTICE violations is adding an if
statement to check the return boolean value of the violated
source code. We note that return values of some violated
source code of this violation type is not boolean type.
Copying the change behavior of the fix pattern directly to
this kind of violations will lead to compilation errors.
Insight 7. Some fix patterns make programs fail to check-
style. Figure 23 presents an example of a patch generated by
our method for a MS_SHOULD_BE_FINAL violation in XmlCon-
verter.java file of camel 29 project, which makes the project
fail to checkstyle.
Insight 8. Some fix patterns of some violations are con-
troversial. For example, the fix patterns of DM_NUMBER_CTOR
violations are replacing the Number constructor with static
Number valueOf method. It has been found that changing
new Integer() to Integer.valueOf() and changing
Integer.valueOf() to new Integer() were reverted
repeatedly. Some developers find that new Integer()
outperforms Integer.valueOf(), and some other de-
velopers find that Integer.valueOf() outperforms new
28https://github.com/eclipse/eclipse.platform/blob/R4 6
maintenance/ant/org.eclipse.ant.core/src ant/org/eclipse/ant/
internal/core/ant/InternalAntRunner.java#L1484
29https://github.com/apache/camel
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Integer(). Additionally, some developers report that
Double.doubleToLongBits() could be more efficient
than new Double() and Double.valueOf() when com-
paring two double values with equals() method. We infer
that the DM_NUMBER_CTOR or DM_FP_NUMBER_CTOR violations
should be identified and revised based on the specific func-
tion, otherwise, developers may be prone to ignoring these
kinds of violations.
4 DISCUSSION
4.1 Threats to validity
A major threat to external validity of our study is the
focus on FindBugs as the static analysis tool, with specific
violation types and names. Fortunately, the code problems
described by FindBugs violations are similar to the vi-
olations described by other static analysis tools. For ex-
ample, NP_NULL_ON_SOME_PATH violations in FindBugs,
Null dereference violations in Facebook Infer, and
ThrowNull violations in Google ErrorProne are about the
same issue: A NULL pointer is dereferenced and will lead
to a NullPointerException when the code is executed. With
the fix pattern of NP_NULL_ON_SOME_PATH of FindBugs
mined in this study, we fixed 9 out of 10 different cases
(each is from a distinct project in our subjects) of Null
dereference violations detected by Facebook Infer and
8 out of 10 different cases of ThrowNull violations detected
by Google ErrorProne, respectively. It shows the potential
generalizability of the inferred fix patterns. We acknowl-
edge, however, that there are some differences between
FindBugs violations and other static analysis violations.
Another threat to external validity of our study is that the fix
patterns of violations are mined from open-source projects.
Our findings might not applicable to industry projects that
could have specific policies related to code quality.
Threats to internal validity include the limitations of the
underlying tools used in this study (i.e., FindBugs and
GumTree). GumTree may produce unfeasible edit scripts.
To reduce this threat, we have added extra labels into
GumTree. FindBugs may produce some violations with
inaccurate positions. To reduce this threat, we re-locate and
re-visit the violated source code with the bug descriptions
of some violation types by FindBugs. FindBugs may yield
high false positives. In order to reduce this threat, we focus
on the common fixed violations in this study since common
fixed violations are really concerned by developers. If the
common fixed violations were addressed by common fix
patterns, the common fixed violations are highly possible to
be true positives and the common fix patterns are highly
possible to be effective resolutions. These threats could be
further reduced by developing more advanced tools.
Threats to internal validity also involve limitations in our
method. Violation tracking may produce false positive fixed
violations. We combine the commit DiffEntry and diffs
parsed by GumTree to reduce this threat. Irrelevant code
contexts can interfere with patterns mining. For example,
one statement contains complex expressions, which may
lead to a high number of irrelevant tokens. If this kind
of violations were not filtered out in this study, it would
increase the interference of noise. To reduce this validity, our
study should be replicated in future work by extracting and
analyzing the key violated source code with relevant code
contexts identified using system dependency graphs. In this
study, we also find that some violations are replaced by
method invocations which encapsulate the detailed source
code changes of fixing the corresponding violations. The
method we proposed extracts source code changes from
source code changing positions of violations. It is challeng-
ing to extract source code changes from these kinds of fixed
violations. In order to reduce this validity, we are planning
to integrate static analysis technique into our method to get
more detailed source code changes.
4.2 Insights on unfixed violations
Given the high proportion of violations that were found
to remain unfixed in software projects, we investigate the
potential reasons for this situation. By comparing, in Sec-
tion 3.3, the code patterns of unfixed violations against
those of fixed patterns, we note that they are commonly
shared, suggesting that the reasons are not mainly due to
the violation code characteristics. Instead, we can enumerate
other implicit reasons based on the observation of statistical
data as well as the comments received during our live study
to fix violations in ten open source projects.
• Actually, many developers do not use FindBugs as
part of their development tool chain. For example, we
found that only 36% of projects in our study include
a commit mentioning FindBugs. Also, interestingly, in
the cases of projects where we found that only 2%
(1,944/88,927) of fixed FindBugs violations explicitly
refer to the FindBugs tool in commit messages.
• As a static analysis tool, FindBugs yields a significant
number of false positives: i.e., violations that develop-
ers do not consider as being true violations. We indeed
highlighted some code patterns of detected violations that
they are inconsistent with the descriptions provided by
FindBugs (cf. Section 3.5).
• Our interaction with developers helped us confirm that
developers do not consider most FindBugs violations as
being severe enough to deserve attention in their devel-
opment process.
• Some violations identified by FindBugs might be con-
troversial because we find that some fix patterns of some
violations are controversial (cf. Insight 8 in Section 3.7.3).
• Finally, with our live study, we note that some developers
may be willing to fix violations if they had in hand some
fix patterns. Unfortunately, FindBugs only reports the
violations, and does not provide in many cases any hint
on how to deal with them. Our work is towards filling this
gap systematically based on harvested knowledge from
developer fixes.
5 RELATED WORK
5.1 Static analysis
Classification of Actionable and Unactionable Violations:
Static analysis violations are studied and investigated from
different aspects. Several studies attempted to classify
actionable (likely to be true positive) and unactionable
(false positive) violations by using machine learning tech-
niques [13], [27], [29]. Classifying new and recurring alarms
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is necessary to prune identical alarms between subsequent
releases. Hash code matching [25] and coding pattern
analysis [12] can be used for identifying recurring viola-
tions. Model checking techniques [66], [67] and constraint
solvers [68], [69] can also verify true violations and prune
false positive. As discussed in Section 3.5, trivial violations
reported by FindBugs can be treated as false positives
by developers, but they cannot be identified by previous
work since they are negligible issues and too trivial to
be addressed by developers. Investigating the violations
recurrently addressed by developers like this study could
reduce this threat to identify true positive violations.
Violation Prioritization: Violation prioritization can
provide a ranked list so that developers focus on important
ones first. Z-ranking [70] prioritizes violations based on ob-
servations of real error trends. Jung et al. leveraged Bayesian
statistics to rank violations [71]. History-based prioritiza-
tion [72], [73], [74] utilizes history of program changes to
prioritize violations. In addition, several studies attempted
to leverage user feedback to rank violations [22], [26], [75].
However, these works did not investigate violations with
the big number of violations as our work, from multiple
aspects as we done. Thus, our work can provide more
reliable insights for violation ranking than these works.
5.2 Change pattern mining
Empirical Studies on Change Patterns: Common change
patterns are useful for various purposes. Pan et al. [62]
explored common bug fix patterns in Java programs to
understand how developers change programs to fix a bug.
Their fix patterns are, however, in a high-level schema (e.g.
“If-related: Addition of Post-condition Check (IF-APTC)”).
Based on the insight, PAR [21] leveraged common pre-
defined fix patterns for automated program repair, that only
contain six fix patterns which can only be used to fix a
small number of bugs. Martinez and Monperrus further
investigated repair models that can be utilized in program
fixing while Zhong and Su [76] conducted a large-scale
study on bug fixing changes in open source projects. Tan
et al. [77] analyzed anti-patterns that may interfere with the
process of automated program repair. However, all of them
studied code changes at the statement level, which is not
as fine-grained as our work that extracts fine-grained code
changes with an extended version of GumTree [16].
Pattern Mining for Code Change: SYDIT [78] and
Lase [79] generate code changes to other code snippets
with the extracted edit scripts from examples in the same
application. RASE [80] focuses on refactoring code clones
with Lase edit scripts [79]. FixMeUp [81] extracts and ap-
plies access control templates to protect sensitive operations.
Their objectives are not to address issues caused by faulty
code in program, such as the static analysis bugs studied in
this study. REFAZER implements an algorithm for learning
syntactic program transformations for C# programs from
examples [82] to correct defects in student submissions,
which however are mostly useless across assignments [83]
and are not really defects in the wild as the violations
in our study. Genesis [83] heuristically infers application-
independent code transform patterns from multiple appli-
cations to fix bugs, but its code transform patterns are
tightly coupled with the nature and syntax of three kinds
of bugs (i.e., null pointer, out of bounds, and class cast
defects). Koyuncu et al. [84] have generalized this approach
with FixMiner to mining fix patterns for all types of bugs
given a large dataset. Our work tries to mine the common
fix patterns for general static analysis violations which are
not application-independent. Closely related to our work
is the concurrent work of Reudismam et al. [85] who try
to learn quick fixes by mining code changes to fix PMD
violations [5]. Their approach aims at learning code change
templates to be systematically applied to refactor code. Our
approach can be used for a similar scenario, and scales to a
huge variety of violation types.
5.3 Bug datasets
Several datasets of real-world bugs have been proposed in
the literature to evaluate approaches in software testing,
software repair, and defect prediction approaches. Do et
al. [86] have thus contributed to testing techniques with a
controlled experimentation platform. The associated dataset
was added to the SIR database, which provides a widely-
used test bed for debugging and test suite optimization.
Lu et al. [87] and Cifuentes et al. [88] have respectively
proposed BugBench and BegBunch as benchmarks for bug
detection tools. Similarly, Dallmeier et al. [89] have proposed
iBugs, a benchmark for bug localization. Similarly to our
process, their benchmark was obtained by extracting histor-
ical bug data. Bug data can also be found in the PROMISE
repository [90] which includes a large variety of datasets
for software engineering research. Le Goues et al. [91] have
designed the GenProg benchmark with C bugs. Just et
al. [20] have proposed Defects4J to evaluate software testing
and repair approaches. Their dataset was collected from
the recent history of five widely-used Java bugs, for which
they could include the associated test suites. To ensure the
reliability of our experiments, we also collect subjects to
identify violations and corresponding patches from real-
world projects. The existing bug datasets focus on the bugs
that make programs fail to pass some test case(s), but our
data is about static analysis violations which may not fail to
pass test cases.
5.4 Program repair
Recent studies of program repair have presented several
achievements. There are mainly two lines of research: (1)
fully automated repair and (2) patch hint suggestion. The
former focuses on automatically generating patches that can
be integrated into a program without human intervention.
The patch generation process often includes patch verifi-
cation to figure out whether the patch does not break the
original functionality when it is applied to the program.
The verification is often achieved by running a given test
suite. Automatize violation repair is included in our future
work. The latter techniques suggest code fragments that can
help create a patch rather than generating a patch ready
to integrate. Developers may use the suggestions to write
patches and verify them manually, that is similar to the
patch generation of our work.
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Fully Automated Repair: Automated program repair
is pioneered by GenProg [92], [93]. This approach lever-
ages genetic programming to create a patch for a given
buggy program. It is followed by an acceptability study [94]
and systematic evaluation [95]. Regarding the acceptabil-
ity issue, Kim et al. [21] advocated GenProg may gener-
ate nonsensical patches and proposed PAR to deal with
the issue. PAR leverages human-written patches to define
fix templates and can generate more acceptable patches.
HDRepair [65] leverages bug fixing history of many projects
to provide better patch candidates to the random search
process. Recently, LSRrepair [96] proposes a live search
approach to the ingredients of automated repair using code
search techniques. While GenProg relies on randomness,
utilizing program synthesis techniques [97], [98], [99] can
directly generate patches even though they are limited to a
certain subset of bugs. Other notable approaches include
contract-based fixing [100], program repair based on be-
havior models [101], and conditional statement repair [102].
This study does not focus on the fully automated program
repair but the automated fix pattern mining for violations.
Patch Hint Suggestion: Patch suggestion studies ex-
plored diverse dimensions. MintHint [103] generates repair
hints based on statistical analysis. Tao et al. [104] investi-
gated how automatically generated patches can be used as
debugging aids. Bissyande´ suggests patches for bug reports
based on the history of patches [105]. Caramel [106] focuses
on potential performance defects and suggests specific types
of patches to fix those defects. Our study is closely related
to patch hint suggestion since we can suggest top-10 most
similar fix patterns for targeting violations. The difference
is that fix patterns in this work are mined from developers’
patch submissions of static analysis violations.
Empirical Studies on Program Repair: Many stud-
ies have explored properties of program repair. Monper-
rus [107] criticized issues of patch generation learned from
human-written patches [21]. Barr et al. discussed the plas-
tic surgery hypothesis [108] that theoretically illustrates
graftibility of bugs from a given program. Long and Rinard
analyzed the search space issues for population-based patch
generation [109]. Smith et al. presented an argument of over-
fitting issues of program repair techniques [110]. Koyuncu
et al. [8] compared the impact of different patch generation
techniques in Linux kernel development. Benchmarks for
program repair are proposed for different programming
languages [20], [91]. Based on a benchmark, a large-scale
replication study was conducted [63]. More recently, Liu
et al. [111] investigated the distribution of code entities
impacted by bug fixes with fine-grained granularity, and
found that some static analysis tools (e.g., FindBugs [14]
and PMD [5]) are involved in some bug fixes.
6 CONCLUSION
In this study, we investigate recurrences of violations as
well as their fixing changes, collected from open source Java
projects. The yielded findings provide a number of insights
into prioritization of violations for developers, as well as for
researchers to improve violation reporting.
In this paper, we propose an approach to mine code
patterns and fix patterns of static analysis violations by
leveraging CNNs and X-means. The identified fix patterns
are evaluated through three experiments. They are first
applied to fixing many unfixed violations in our subjects.
Second, we manage to get 67 of 116 generated patches ac-
cepted by the developer community and eventually merged
into 10 open source Java projects. Third, interestingly, the
mined fix patterns were effective for addressing 4 real bugs
in the Defects4J benchmark.
As further work, we plan to combine fix pattern min-
ing with automated program repair techniques to generate
violation fixes more automatically. In the live study, we
find that some common violations never occurred in latest
versions of those projects. We postulate that violation recur-
rences may be time-varying. Our future work also includes
studies on the time-variant issue of violation recurrences to
further figure out the historic changes of fixed violations and
the latest trend of violations, which may help new directions
of violation prioritization.
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APPENDIX A
BUG FIX PROCESS
A fix pattern is used as a guide to fix a bug, of which fixing
process is defined as a bug fix process.
Definition 7. Bug Fix Process (FIX): A bug fix process is a
function of fixing a bug with a set of fix patterns.
FIX : (bc, FP+)→ P ∗ (7)
where bc is the code block of a bug. FP+ means a set of
fix patterns, and some of them could be applied to bc. P ∗
is a set of patches for bc, which is generated by the bug fix
process. A bug fix process is specified by a bug fix function in
this study.
Definition 8. Bug Fix Function (FixF): A bug fix function
consists of two domains and three sub functions. They can
be formalized as:
FixF : (bc, FP+) = CtxF +M +R→ P ∗ (8)
CtxF : bc→ Ctxbc (9)
M : (Ctxbc, Ctxfp ∈ FP+)→ FP ∗ (10)
R : (bc, Ctxbc, CO ∈ FP ∗)→ P ∗ (11)
where bc is the code block of a given bug and FP+ is a set of
fix patterns. CtxF denotes the function of converting buggy
code into a code context (i.e., Ctxbc). M means the matching
function of matching the code context of the given buggy
code block with fix patterns to find appropriate fix patterns
(i.e., FP ∗, FP ∗ ⊆ FP+) for the bug, where Ctxfp is the
code context of a fix pattern. If FP ∗ = ∅, it indicates that
there is no fix pattern matched for the bug in the whole set
of fix patterns. R represents the function of repairing the bug
with change operations (i.e., CO) in matched fix patterns. If
P ∗ = ∅, it indicates that there is no any patch which could
be generated by the provided fix patterns and pass test cases
of the bug.
APPENDIX B
STATISTICS ON VIOLATIONS IN THE WILD
In this section, we present the distributions of violations
from three aspects of violations: number of occurrences,
spread in projects and category. There are 16,918,530 distinct
violations distributed throughout 400 types in our dataset.
We investigate which violation types are common by check-
ing their recurrences in terms of quantity (i.e., how many
times they occur overall) and in terms of spread (i.e., in how
many projects they occur).
Common types by number of occurrences.
Figure 24 shows the quantity distributions of all detected
violation types. The x-axis represents arbitrary id numbers
assigned to violation types following the number of times
that occur in our dataset. The id mapping considered in this
figure by sorting occurrences (i.e., id=1 corresponds to the
most occurring violation type) will be used in the rest of this
paper unless otherwise indicated. The Order 1 of Table 14
presents the mapping of top 50 types. The whole mapping
TABLE 13: Category Distributions of Violations
Category # Violationinstances
# Violation types # Projectstop-50 top-100 All
Dodgy code 6,736,692 22 29 75 703
Bad practice 4,467,817 11 34 86 696
Performance 1,822,063 8 13 29 685
Malicious code vulnerability 1,774,747 4 8 17 634
Internationalization 740,392 2 2 2 632
Multithreaded correctness 602,233 2 4 44 517
Correctness 542,687 0 6 131 636
Experimental 135,559 1 2 3 446
Security 95,258 0 2 11 219
Other 1,082 0 0 2 51
is available at the aforementioned website for interested
readers.
It is noted from the obtained distribution that violation
occurrences for the top 50 violation types account for 81.4%
of all violation occurrences. These types correspond only
to about 12% of FindBugs violation types. These statistics
corroborate our conjecture that most violation instances are
associated with a limited subset of violation types.
Figure 24 further highlights the category of each vio-
lation type according to the categorization by FindBugs.
We note that all categories are represented among most and
least occurring violations alike.
Common types by spread in projects
Figure 25 illustrates to what extent the various violation
types appear in projects. The id numbers for violation types
are from the mapping produced before (i.e., as in Figure 24).
Almost 200 (50%) violation types have been associated with
over 100 (about 14%) projects. It is further noted that there
is no correlation between the spread of a violation type and
its number of occurrences: some violation types among the
most widespread types (e.g., top-50) actually occur less than
some lesser widespread ones. Nevertheless, the data indi-
cate that, together, the top-50 most widespread violations
account also for the majority of violation instances.
Category distributions of violations
Table 13 provides the statistics on the categories of vi-
olation types regrouped in the FindBugs documenta-
tion. The ranking of violation types is based on over-
all occurrences as in Figure 24. Category Other contains
SKIPPED_CLASS_TOO_BIG and TESTING that actually are not
violation types defined in FindBugs. In the remainder of
our experiments, instances of the two types are ignored.
Dodgy code and Bad practice appear as the top two
most common categories in terms of occurrence and spread.
Security violations are the least common, although they
could be found in 30% of the projects.
In terms of violation types, Correctness regroups the
largest number of types, but its types are not among the top
occurring. Figure 26 illustrates the detailed distributions of
categories. The number of violation types of Correctness
increases sharply from the ranking 100 to 400, while there
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Fig. 24: Quantity distributions of violation types sorted by their occurrences. The x-axis represents arbitrary id numbers
assigned to violation types. The y-axis represents the percentages of their occurrences in all violations.
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to carry out the category distributions, of which the order is consistent with the order in Figure 24. For example, 50 means
that top 50 violation types are used to carry out the category distributions.
is no correctness-related violation type in top 50 types.
The violation types out of top 100 have much lower num-
ber of occurrences compared against top 100 types. Thus,
Correctness has a low number of overall occurrences,
although it contains a large number of violation types
and is seen in many projects. These findings suggest that
developers commit few violations of these types.
Overall, Dodgy code and Bad practice are the top
two most common categories. Internationalization is
also found to be common since it contains only two viola-
tion types (i.e., DM_CONVERT_CASE and DM_DEFAULT_ENCODING)
which are among top-20 most occurring violation types and
among top-10 most widespread ones throughout projects.
Dodgy code represents either confusing, anomalous, or
error-prone source code [112]. Figure 27 shows an example
of a fixed Dodgy code violation, which is a fixed viola-
tion of BC_VACUOUS_INSTANCEOF type that denotes that the
instanceof test would always return true, unless the
value being checked was null [112]. Although this is safe,
make sure it is not an indication of some misunderstandings
or some other logic errors. If the programmer really wants
to check the value for being null, it would be clearer and
better to do a null check rather than an instanceof test.
Consequently, this violated instance is fixed by replacing the
instanceof test with a null check.
Bad practice means that source code violates recom-
mended coding practices [112]. The fixed violation in Fig-
ure 2 is an example of a corrected Bad practice violation.
It is not recommended to ellipsis an instanceof test when
implementing an equals(Object o) method, so that this
violation is fixed by adding an instanceof test.
30https://github.com/antlr/stringtemplate4
31https://github.com/apache/httpclient
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Violation Type: BC_VACUOUS_INSTANCEOF.
Fixing DiffEntry:
- if (code.strings[poolIndex] instanceof String) {
+ if (code.strings[poolIndex] != null) {
Fig. 27: Example of a fixed Dodgy code violation taken
from BytecodeDisassembler.java file within Commit e2713c
in project ANTLR Stringtemplate430.
Violation Type: DM_CONVERT_CASE.
Fixing DiffEntry:
- cookieDomain = domain.toLowerCase();
+ cookieDomain = domain.toLowerCase(Locale.ENGLISH);
Fig. 28: Example of a fixed Internationalization viola-
tion taken from BytecodeDisassembler.java file within Com-
mit 17bacf in project Apache httpclient31.
Internationalization denotes that source code
uses non-localized method invocations [112]. Figure 28
presents an example of a fixed Internationalization
violation, which is a fixed DM_CONVERT_ CASE violation that
means that a String is being converted to upper or lower
case by using the default encoding of the platform [14].
This may result in improper conversions when used with
international characters, therefore, this violation is fixed
by adding a rule of Locale.ENGLISH. For more definitions
of categories and descriptions of violation types, please
reference paper [112] and FindBugs Bug Descriptions [14].
Static analysis techniques are widely used in modern
software projects32. However, developers and researchers
have no clear knowledge on the distributions of violations
in the real world, especially for the fixed violations (See
Section 3.3). The empirical analysis can provide an overview
of this knowledge from three different aspects: occurrences,
spread and categories of violations, that can be used to
rank violations for developers. The high false positives of
FindBugs and the common non-severe violations could
threaten the validity of the violation ranking. To reduce
this threat, we further investigate the distributions of fixed
violations in the next section. Fixed violations are resolved
by developers, which means that they are detected with
correct positions and are treated as issues being addressed,
Thus they are likely to be true violations.
APPENDIX C
STATISTICS ON FIXED VIOLATIONS
This section presents the distributions of fixed violations
with their recurrences in terms of quantity and in terms
of spread. We further compare the distributions of fixed
violations and detected ones.
Common types of fixed violations
Figure 29 presents the distributions (in terms of quantity) of
fixed violation types sorted by the number of their instances.
Fixed violation instances of the top 50 (15%) fixed types
(presented by Order 2 in Table 14) account for about 80%
of all fixed violations. Additionally, 122 (about 37%) types
32http://findbugs.sourceforge.net/users.html
are represented in less than 20 instances, 91 (about 27%)
types are represented in less than 10 instances, and 20 (6%)
types are associated with a single fixed violation instance.
These data further suggest that only a few violation types
are concerned by developers.
Figure 30 illustrates the appearance of violation types
throughout software projects. There is no correlation be-
tween the spread of a fixed violation type and its number
of instances: some fixed violation types among the most
spread actually occur less than some lesser spread ones.
Nevertheless, the top-50 most spread violations account for
the majority of fixed violation instances. Additionally, we
note that 63 (19%) fixed violation types occur in at least 10%
(55/547) projects, which further suggests that only a few
violation types are concerned by developers.
Recurrences of types: fixed types VS. all detected ones
Table 14 provides comparison data on the occurrence ratios
of fixed violation types against detected violation types. We
consider two rankings based on the occurred quantities for
all detected violations and for only fixed violations respec-
tively, and select top-50 violation types in each ranking for
comparison. If the value of R1/R2 or R2/R1 is close to 1,
it means that the violation type has a similar ratio in both
fixed instances and detected ones. We refer to this value as
Fluctuation Ratio (hereafter FR).
In the left side of Table 14, there are 12 violation types
marked in green, for which FR values range between 0.80
and 1.20. We consider in such cases that the occurrences
are comparable across all violations and fixed violations
instances. These 12 violation types have one more type
than the types marked in green in the right side because
the last type in the left side is not in the top 50 of the
right side. On the other hand, FR values of 21 violation
types are over 1.5, 10 of them are over 3.0, and 4 of them
are even over 10: these numbers suggest that the relevant
violation types with high recurrences do not appear to have
high priorities of being fixed. Combining FR values and
Ratio 2 values, one can infer that developers make a few
efforts to fix violation instances for types SE_BAD_FIELD,
NM_CLASS_NAMING_CONVENTION, SE_TRANSIENT_FIELD_NOT_RE
STORED, NP_METHOD_PARAMETER_TIGHTENS_ANNOTATION or EQ_
DOESNT_OVERRIDE_EQUALS.
In the right side of Table 14, FR values of 23 violation
types are over 1.5, 4 of them are over 3.0, and one of them
is even over 20: these numbers suggest that the relevant
violation types with low recurrences do appear to have
high priorities of being fixed. Combining FR values and
Ratio 2 values, which can infer that developers ensure that
violations of type NP_NONNULL_RETURN_VIOLATION are fixed
with higher priority than others. Additionally, 13 violation
types marked in bold in the right side are in the top 50
ranking of fixed violations but not in the top 50 ranking of
all detected violations, and vice versa to the types marked
in bold in the left side of this table.
To sum up, these findings suggest that fixed violation
types have different recurrences compared against detected
violation types. The order of fixed violation types and the
FR values of fixed violation types can provide better criteria
to help prioritize violations than the order of all detected
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Fig. 29: Quantity distributions of all fixed violation types sorted by their occurrences. The values on x-axis are the id numbers
assigned to fixed violation types, which are different from the id numbers in Figure 24. The values of y-axis are the percentages
of their occurrences in all fixed violations.
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Fig. 30: Spread distributions of all fixed violation types. The x-axis is the same order as in Figure 29. The values of y-axis are
percentages of all fixed types in projects.
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Fig. 31: Category distributions of fixed violation types. The values on x-axis represent the threshold of fixed types ranking
used to carry out the category distributions, of which the order is consistent with the order in Figure 29. For example, 50
means that top 50 violation types are used to carry out the category distributions.
violation types, since fixed violations are concerned and
resolved by developers.
Category distributions of fixed violations
Table 15 presents the category distributions of fixed viola-
tions. Dodgy code is the most common fixed category, and
the following two secondary common fixed categories are
Performance and Bad practice in terms of occurrences
and spread. Fixed Security violations are the least com-
mon, although they are found in 10% of the projects with
fixed violations.
In terms of violation types, Correctness regroups the
largest number of fixed violation types, but they are not
among the top occurring. Figure 31 illustrates the detailed
distributions of categories. The number of violation types
of Correctness increases sharply from the ranking 50 to
331, and there are a few correctness-related violation types
in the top 50 types. However, the violation types out of top
50 have much lower number of occurrences compared to
top 50 types. Therefore, Correctness has a low number
of overall fixed occurrences, although it contains the largest
number of fixed violation types and is seen in many projects.
The top 50 types are mainly occupied by Dodgy code,
Performance and Bad practice categories.
Category Performance represents the inefficient mem-
ory usage or buffer allocation, or usage of non-static
class [112]. Figure 32 presents an example of a fixed
Performance violation. It is a SBSC_USE_STRINGBUFFER
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TABLE 14: Comparison of distributions of fixed violation types against all detected violation types. Order 1 refers to the
sorting order of violation types by the quantities of all detected violations (cf. the order in Figure 24). Order 2 refers to the
sorting of violation types by the quantities of all fixed violations (cf., order in Figure 29). Ratio 1 represents the occurred
ratio of a given violation type in the all detected violations. Ratio 2 represents the occurred ratio of a given fixed violation
type in all fixed violations. R1/R2 is used to measure the fluctuation ratio of a violation type from all detected violations to
fixed violations, the same as R2/R1.
id Order 1 (Top 50 all detected types) Ratio 1(%) Ratio 2(%) R1/R2 Order 2 (Top 50 all fixed types) Ratio 1(%) Ratio 2(%) R2/R1
1 SE NO SERIALVERSIONID 8.19 2.19 3.73 SIC INNER SHOULD BE STATIC ANON 3.15 8.81 2.80
2 RCN REDUNDANT NULLCHECK OF NONNULL VALUE 5.15 3.24 1.59 DLS DEAD LOCAL STORE 3.64 5.74 1.58
3 BC UNCONFIRMED CAST 4.24 2.65 1.60 DM CONVERT CASE 1.89 4.04 2.14
4 DLS DEAD LOCAL STORE 3.64 5.74 0.63 DM DEFAULT ENCODING 2.49 3.52 1.41
5 EI EXPOSE REP 3.20 1.35 2.36 UWF FIELD NOT INITIALIZED IN CONSTRUCTOR 2.29 3.49 1.53
6 SIC INNER SHOULD BE STATIC ANON 3.15 8.81 0.36 RCN REDUNDANT NULLCHECK OF NONNULL VALUE 5.15 3.24 0.63
7 EI EXPOSE REP2 3.14 1.50 2.09 NM METHOD NAMING CONVENTION 2.77 2.89 1.04
8 SE BAD FIELD 3.04 0.29 10.36 URF UNREAD FIELD 1.26 2.88 2.29
9 NM METHOD NAMING CONVENTION 2.77 2.89 0.96 BC UNCONFIRMED CAST 4.24 2.65 0.63
10 DM DEFAULT ENCODING 2.49 3.52 0.71 REC CATCH EXCEPTION 2.43 2.42 1.00
11 REC CATCH EXCEPTION 2.43 2.42 1.00 BC UNCONFIRMED CAST OF RETURN VALUE 2.02 2.25 1.12
12 UWF FIELD NOT INITIALIZED IN CONSTRUCTOR 2.29 3.49 0.66 SE NO SERIALVERSIONID 8.19 2.19 0.27
13 PZLA PREFER ZERO LENGTH ARRAYS 2.19 0.63 3.46 UPM UNCALLED PRIVATE METHOD 1.03 2.16 2.10
14 BC UNCONFIRMED CAST OF RETURN VALUE 2.02 2.25 0.90 VA FORMAT STRING USES NEWLINE 0.25 1.72 6.90
15 RI REDUNDANT INTERFACES 1.91 0.62 3.10 MS SHOULD BE FINAL 1.72 1.71 0.99
16 DM CONVERT CASE 1.89 4.04 0.47 RV RETURN VALUE IGNORED BAD PRACTICE 0.78 1.67 2.15
17 ST WRITE TO STATIC FROM INSTANCE METHOD 1.82 1.57 1.16 ST WRITE TO STATIC FROM INSTANCE METHOD 1.82 1.57 0.87
18 SF SWITCH NO DEFAULT 1.81 0.86 2.10 EI EXPOSE REP2 3.14 1.50 0.48
19 MS SHOULD BE FINAL 1.72 1.71 1.01 URF UNREAD PUBLIC OR PROTECTED FIELD 1.26 1.49 1.18
20 NP LOAD OF KNOWN NULL VALUE 1.40 1.14 1.22 WMI WRONG MAP ITERATOR 0.72 1.47 2.04
21 URF UNREAD PUBLIC OR PROTECTED FIELD 1.26 1.49 0.85 OBL UNSATISFIED OBLIGATION 0.52 1.40 2.69
22 URF UNREAD FIELD 1.26 2.88 0.44 EI EXPOSE REP 3.20 1.35 0.42
23 LI LAZY INIT STATIC 1.25 0.39 3.20 NP LOAD OF KNOWN NULL VALUE 1.40 1.14 0.82
24 NM CLASS NAMING CONVENTION 1.23 0.10 12.89 DM NUMBER CTOR 1.10 1.04 0.94
25 MS PKGPROTECT 1.14 0.55 2.07 SIC INNER SHOULD BE STATIC 0.83 1.00 1.22
26 DM NUMBER CTOR 1.10 1.04 1.07 SBSC USE STRINGBUFFER CONCATENATION 0.48 0.97 2.03
27 UPM UNCALLED PRIVATE METHOD 1.03 2.16 0.48 OS OPEN STREAM EXCEPTION PATH 0.49 0.91 1.87
28 FE FLOATING POINT EQUALITY 1.02 0.48 2.14 NP NONNULL RETURN VIOLATION 0.04 0.87 23.00
29 IS2 INCONSISTENT SYNC 0.99 0.71 1.38 SF SWITCH NO DEFAULT 1.81 0.86 0.48
30 NP PARAMETER MUST BE NONNULL BUT MARKED AS NULLABLE 0.87 0.50 1.75 UWF UNWRITTEN FIELD 0.18 0.84 4.73
31 SE TRANSIENT FIELD NOT RESTORED 0.85 0.04 22.95 DE MIGHT IGNORE 0.71 0.79 1.11
32 NP METHOD PARAMETER TIGHTENS ANNOTATION 0.83 0.04 23.16 IS2 INCONSISTENT SYNC 0.99 0.71 0.72
33 SIC INNER SHOULD BE STATIC 0.83 1.00 0.83 DM BOXED PRIMITIVE FOR PARSING 0.24 0.71 2.90
34 RV RETURN VALUE IGNORED BAD PRACTICE 0.78 1.67 0.47 RV RETURN VALUE IGNORED NO SIDE EFFECT 0.27 0.64 2.42
35 DLS DEAD LOCAL STORE OF NULL 0.72 0.19 3.85 ODR OPEN DATABASE RESOURCE 0.22 0.64 2.86
36 WMI WRONG MAP ITERATOR 0.72 1.47 0.49 PZLA PREFER ZERO LENGTH ARRAYS 2.19 0.63 0.29
37 DE MIGHT IGNORE 0.71 0.79 0.90 RI REDUNDANT INTERFACES 1.91 0.62 0.32
38 CI CONFUSED INHERITANCE 0.62 0.23 2.67 NP NULL ON SOME PATH FROM RETURN VALUE 0.31 0.61 1.99
39 NM CONFUSING 0.61 0.43 1.44 UCF USELESS CONTROL FLOW 0.53 0.61 1.15
40 EQ DOESNT OVERRIDE EQUALS 0.56 0.08 6.96 UC USELESS CONDITION 0.39 0.59 1.49
41 UCF USELESS CONTROL FLOW 0.53 0.61 0.87 NP NULL ON SOME PATH 0.29 0.59 2.07
42 OBL UNSATISFIED OBLIGATION 0.52 1.40 0.37 UC USELESS OBJECT 0.15 0.58 3.96
43 ES COMPARING STRINGS WITH EQ 0.52 0.51 1.00 DM FP NUMBER CTOR 0.40 0.57 1.43
44 OS OPEN STREAM EXCEPTION PATH 0.49 0.91 0.53 MS PKGPROTECT 1.14 0.55 0.48
45 SBSC USE STRINGBUFFER CONCATENATION 0.48 0.97 0.49 SQL PREPARED STATEMENT GENERATED FROM NONCONSTANT STRING 0.27 0.55 2.07
46 SF SWITCH FALLTHROUGH 0.44 0.15 2.95 OBL UNSATISFIED OBLIGATION EXCEPTION EDGE 0.28 0.55 1.96
47 RCN REDUNDANT NULLCHECK OF NULL VALUE 0.40 0.24 1.68 ES COMPARING STRINGS WITH EQ 0.52 0.51 1.00
48 DM FP NUMBER CTOR 0.40 0.57 0.70 OS OPEN STREAM 0.36 0.51 1.40
49 UC USELESS CONDITION 0.39 0.59 0.67 RCN REDUNDANT NULLCHECK WOULD HAVE BEEN A NPE 0.24 0.50 2.08
50 HE EQUALS USE HASHCODE 0.39 0.47 0.82 NP PARAMETER MUST BE NONNULL BUT MARKED AS NULLABLE 0.87 0.50 0.57
TABLE 15: Category distributions of fixed violations.
Category # Violationinstances
# Violation types # Projectstop-50 top-100 All
Dodgy code 30,419 18 31 72 505
Performance 19,248 9 13 27 450
Bad practice 15,640 9 24 71 419
Correctness 6,809 5 16 99 384
Internationalization 6,719 2 2 2 347
Malicious code vulnerability 5,505 3 7 16 299
Multithreaded correctness 2,018 1 3 34 208
Experimental 1,748 2 2 3 162
Security 821 1 2 7 47
_CONCATENATION violation which denotes that concatenat-
ing strings using the + operator in a loop [14]. In each
iteration, the String is converted to a StringBuffer or
StringBuilder, appended to, and converted back to a
String, which can lead to a cost quadratic in the number of
iterations, as the growing string is recopied in each iteration.
33https://github.com/apache/pdfbox
Violation Type: SBSC_USE_STRINGBUFFER_CONCATENATION.
Fixing DiffEntry:
- String colorStr = "";
+ StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
for (float f : color) {
- if (!colorStr.isEmpty()){
+ if (sb.length() > 0){
- colorStr += " ";
+ sb.append(’ ’);
}
- colorStr += String.format("%3.2f", f);
+ sb.append(String.format("%3.2f", f));
}
Fig. 32: Example of a fixed Performance violation, taken
from Vertex.java file within Commit 36e820 in Apache
pdfbox33 project.
Internationalization is also found to be a common
fixed category since it has 6,719 fixed violation instances
taken from 347 (63.3%) projects and contains only two viola-
tion types (i.e., DM_CONVERT_CASE and DM_DEFAULT_ENCODING)
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TABLE 16: Comparison of category distributions of all de-
tected violations and fixed violations.
Category % Violation Occurrences in FR values(F/D)All detected (D) Fixed (F)
Experimental 0.8 1.97 2.46
Correctness 3.21 7.66 2.37
Performance 10.77 21.64 2.01
Internationalization 4.38 7.56 1.73
Security 0.56 0.92 1.70
Dodgy code 39.82 34.21 0.86
Bad practice 26.41 17.59 0.67
Multithreaded correctness 3.56 2.27 0.64
Malicious code vulnerability 10.49 6.19 0.59
that are among top-5 most occurring violation types and
among top-10 most widespread throughout projects.
To sum up, these findings suggest that developers
may prefer to take more efforts on fixing violations of
the four categories, i.e., Dodgy code, Performance, Bad
practice and Internationalization, than others.
Category distributions: fixed Violations VS. all detected
ones
Table 16 shows the comparing results of category distribu-
tions of fixed violations against all detected ones. Overall,
the ratios of top-5 categories occurrences in fixed violations
have increases compared against their ratios in all detected
ones. Particularly, the top-3 categories have great increases
(more than one fold).
The ratio of Performance occurrence in fixed viola-
tions has a great increase of 11% compared against its
ratio in all ones, which can suggest that developers take
many efforts to fix Performance violations. The ratio
of Internationalization occurrence in fixed viola-
tions also has a great increase compared against its ratio
in all detected ones. And the Internationalization
contains only two violation types that have high rank-
ings in quantity and spread distributions respectively. So
that, it implies that developers take many efforts to fix
Internationalization violations as well. Even though
Correctness Experimental and Security occurrences
in fixed violations and all detected ones do not present good
rankings, their occurrence ratios in fixed violations have
great increases compared against their ratios in all detected
ones. The ratios of Dodgy code and Bad practice oc-
currences in fixed violations have great decreases compared
with their ratios in all detected ones, although they occupy
the main proportion in fixed violations.
To sum up, when ranking categories with their FR val-
ues, total different priorities of violation categories can be
carried out.
APPENDIX D
VIOLATION CODE PATTERNS
Example of mined violation code patterns which are
consistent with FindBugs documentation.
We note that identified common code patterns of many
violation types are consistent with the bug descriptions by
FindBugs. We consider in the following 10 example cases
of violation types to investigate the possibility for mining
patterns.
DM_CONVERT_CASE is converting a string variable or lit-
eral to an upper or lower case with the platform’s de-
fault encoding [14]. It may result in improper conversions
when used with international characters. The two pat-
terns are method invocations of String.toUpperCase() and
String.toLowerCase().
RCN_REDUNDANT_NULLCHECK_OF_NONNULL_VALUE represents
that the current statement contains a redundant check of a
known non-null value against the constant null [14]. Four
kinds of common patterns are found in this study, which
are shown in Table 5.
BC_UNCONFIRMED_CAST denotes that the current cast is
unchecked with an instanceof test, and not all instances
can be cast from their type to the target type that is
being cast to [14]. In the three patterns, T1 is the target
type, and v2 or exp1 are the value or expression be-
ing cast. BC_UNCONFIRMED_CAST_OF_RETURN_VALUE has similar
patterns, which denotes an unchecked cast of the return
value of a method invocation.
RV_RETURN_VALUE_IGNORED_BAD_PRACTICE means that the
current statement does not check the return value of a
method invocation which could indicate an unusual or
unexpected function execution [14]. Its patterns consist of
a file’s creation, a file’s deletion and a method invocation
with a return value.
DM_NUMBER_CTOR is using a number constructor to create
a number object, which is inefficient [14]. For example,
using new Integer(...) is guaranteed to always result in a
new Integer object whereas Integer.valueOf(...) allows
caching of values to be done by the compiler, class library,
or JVM. Using cached values can avoid object allocation
and the code will be faster. Our mined patterns are the
five types of number creations with number constructors.
DM_FP_NUMBER_CTRO has the similar patterns with it.
DM_BOXED_PRIMITIVE_FOR_PARSING denotes that a boxed
primitive value is created from a String value without using
an effective static parseXXX method [14]. The two common
patterns are Integer.valueOf(str) and Long.valueOf(str).
PZLA_PREFER_ZERO_LENGTH_ARRAYS means that an array-
returned method returns a null reference which is not an
explicit presentation of an empty list of results [14]. It leads
to the clients needing a null check for this return value.
ES_COMPARING_STRINGS_WITH_EQ denotes the comparison
of two strings using == or != operator [14]. Unless both
strings either were constants in a source file or had been in-
terned using the String.intern() method, the same string
value might be represented by two different String objects.
APPENDIX E
REASONS FOR FAILURE TO RESOLVE UNFIXED VIO-
LATIONS
We have identified 23 violation types where we could
not successfully resolve the associated unfixed violations.
According to our observation, it might be caused by the
following reasons:
Reason 1. It is difficult to match effective fix patterns
for specific violations. For example, DE_MIGHT_IGNORE viola-
tions are fixed by replacing the Exception with a specific
exception class. Therefore, it is challenging to match an ap-
propriate specific exception class for this kind of violations
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in terms of syntax without any semantic information or test
cases.
Reason 2. It is challenging to identify common fix
patterns from the source code changes of some violations
without an exact position. For example, UWF_FIELD_NOT
_INITIALIZED_IN_CONSTRUCTOR means that non-null fields
are not initialized in any constructors [14]. Our observation
shows that the positions of this kind of violations are located
in one constructor. So that, it is impossible to obtain any in-
formation about these violations. Even if some information
of these violations could be identified, which are the specific
information, it is still a challenge to match any effective fix
patterns for them.
Reason 3. It is unable to fix NM_METHOD_NAMING_CONVEN-
TION violations which do not comply the method naming
convention. Even if violated method names can be fixed
by matched fix patterns, the changed name may cause
compilation errors or API changes that may break client
programs.
Reason 4. It is challenging to fix all related violations
just by deleting the violated source code. For example,
the common fix pattern of EI_EXPOSE_REP is deleting the
violated source code. When the fix pattern is used to fix
related violations, the changed source code may not be
correctly compiled.
Reason 5. There might be a lack of effective fix patterns
for some violation types. The fix patterns of some violation
types are deleting the violated source code. We do not adopt
this kind of fix patterns, even though the violation can
be fixed or removed by deleting the violated source code,
which removes the feature of original source code and many
of them failed to pass compile or checkstyle.
